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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States and its commercial citizenry have 
significant, and financially valuable, interests when it comes to 
foreign protection for popular U.S. brand names.1  Commercial 
actors pay close attention to the availability of trademark 
protection abroad, especially protection available in advance of 
the establishment of local sales or business units.  For example, 
McDonald’s Corporation fought hard in the 1990s to protect its 
trademarks from a local infringer in South Africa before 
beginning to operate in that country.2  It succeeded.  Starbucks 
Corporation successfully defended its rights in Russia against a 
trademark “pirate” who registered the STARBUCKS mark in 
2005 and then tried to extort $600,000 from the company when it 
contemplated opening local units.3  Successes like these depend 
on foreign enforcement of internationally agreed protection for 
 
1 See, e.g., 100 Best Global Brands, BUS. WK., Sept. 17, 2009, http://www. 
businessweek.com/interactive_reports/best_global_brands_2009.html (ranking the 
one hundred most valuable global brands and finding half to be owned by U.S. 
companies); The 100 Top Brands, BUS. WK., Aug. 1, 2005, at 90–94 (ranking fifty-
three U.S. brands among the top 100 global brands in terms of economic value). 
2 See McDonald’s Corp. v. Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant, 1997 (1) SA 1 (SCA) 
(S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/1996/82.html; see also 5 
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 29:62 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing the McDonald’s case in South Africa); cf. 
McDonald’s Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp. Ltd., [1997] F.S.R. 200 (Jam. Sup. Ct.) 
(refusing a preliminary injunction against a Jamaican restaurant operator using the 
name “McDonald’s” and leaving for a full trial the question of the relevant date by 
which McDonald’s Corp. would be required to prove its trademark goodwill had 
reached Jamaica and whether such goodwill is obtainable under Jamaican law 
without local business operations). 
3 See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:61 (discussing the Starbucks case in 
Russia); see also Kim Tong-hyung, Starbucks Loses Trademark Dispute, KOREA 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2007 (referencing the Korean Supreme Court’s opinion in a case 
where Starbucks and an alleged infringer had both opened their first Korean 
locations in 1999 and translating that opinion as stating: “Considering the period of 
time Starbucks has used its trademark in business, how it was represented in 
advertisements, and the frequency of such advertisements, we cannot conclude that 
the Starbucks trademark was well-known in the local market at the time Elpreya 
registered its [Starpreya] trademark.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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well-known marks.  But can a foreign company considering an 
expansion into the U.S. market expect comparable treatment 
here?  In light of recent developments in U.S. law, the answer is 
a resounding “maybe.”  As a result, foreign support for 
enforcement of this vital type of trademark protection may 
wane.4  Decreased international enforcement of protections for 
well-known foreign marks5 would be very costly for U.S. 
businesses. 
Protection for well-known foreign marks is required under 
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
(the “Paris Convention”)6 as well as the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the “TRIPS 
Agreement”)7 and several other international agreements of 
which the United States is a member nation.8  Owners of well-
known foreign marks have sought protection in the United States 
through both civil litigation and inter partes proceedings at the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office.  Not all United 
States courts facing a well-known mark claim have found the 
foreign mark at issue to be well known or otherwise to satisfy the 
requirements for a successful trademark infringement suit.9  But 
 
4 See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539 
(1995) (“If the United States is to be able to gain the benefits of international accords 
and have a role as a trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, its courts should be 
most cautious before interpreting its domestic legislation in such [a] manner as to 
violate international agreements.”); see also Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (making the more general, but no less powerful, 
observation that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of 
nations if any other possible construction remains”). 
5 See infra Part II for a discussion of the meaning of “well-known foreign marks” 
and the scope of protection for those marks under international agreements. 
6 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 6bis, Mar. 20, 
1888, 13 U.S.T. 2, 828 U.N.T.S. 107, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. 
7 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 
16(2)–(3), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, annex 1C, art. 22.1, 108 Stat. 4809, 869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/ 
legal_e/27-trips.pdf. 
8 See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1708(6), Dec. 
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993); Inter-American Convention for Trademark and 
Commercial Protection, art. 7, Feb. 20, 1929, 46 Stat. 2907, 2918; see also sources 
cited infra note 55. 
9 A successful trademark infringement action requires proof of: (1) ownership of 
rights in a mark; (2) protectability of the mark, with protectable marks being those 
with either inherent distinctiveness or acquired distinctiveness and with some 
evidentiary benefits being gained by registration of the mark as compared to an 
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until very recently, no court had denied the existence of Lanham 
Act protection for well-known foreign marks.10  In 2004, the 
Ninth Circuit expressly held that well-known foreign marks are 
entitled to protection under federal law.11  A 2007 Second Circuit 
decision, however, flatly denied the existence of such protection.12  
This divergence has muddied the water with respect to the 
availability of protection in the United States for well-known 
foreign marks that have been neither registered nor used in 
commerce in the United States.13 
 
unregistered mark; and (3) a likelihood of confusion in the minds of consumers about 
the origin, sponsorship, affiliation, or connection of the goods or services in question. 
See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117 
(2004); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768–69 (1992); see also 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a)–(b), 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). For the difference between 
inherent and acquired distinctiveness, see infra note 93. 
10 See infra Part III. In brief, the recent move away from protection began with a 
2005 Southern District of New York decision that refused to recognize a cause of 
action for infringement of a well-known foreign mark under the Lanham Act. See 
Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005). Just the year before, a different judge in the Southern District of New York 
had found the opposite to be true. See Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 
2004 WL 602295, at *30 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2004). Earlier decisions of federal courts 
and the Trademark Trial & Appeals Board had acknowledged the doctrine but rarely 
applied it, based on the positions of the parties and the facts of the cases. Two state 
court decisions in New York had provided protection under state law. The 
affirmative split between circuits arose from a 2004 Ninth Circuit decision and a 
2007 Second Circuit decision, as further outlined and detailed in Part III. 
11 See Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1098–99, 1109 
(9th Cir. 2004). 
12 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2007). 
13 More recent developments have done nothing to ameliorate the confusion. In 
its 2007 decision in ITC, the Second Circuit certified two questions regarding well-
known foreign marks to the New York Court of Appeals at the same time it denied 
the existence of federal protection for such marks. See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 9 
N.Y.3d 467, 471, 880 N.E.2d 852, 854, 850 N.Y.S.2d 366, 368 (2007). The New York 
high court answered the questions by affirming the existence of New York state 
protection through a misappropriation theory under unfair competition law and 
providing a fairly generous standard to be met by the foreign mark in order for the 
protection to apply. See id. And although the Second Circuit found the state law 
doctrine to be inapplicable in ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 518 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 
2008), a Southern District of New York judge applied it less than a year later, in 
favor of the owner of a different well-known foreign mark. See Empresa Cubana del 
Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 587 F. Supp. 2d 622, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (granting the 
owner of a foreign mark a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from an earlier judgment on 
grounds that the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in ITC was an 
intervening development of law creating “extraordinary circumstances” warranting 
relief), rev’d, 2010 WL 2759416 (2d Cir. July 14, 2010) (reversing the district court 
on the basis that the New York decision was not an intervening development of law 
warranting relief under Rule 60(b)). 
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By denying the existence of a federal trademark 
infringement or unfair competition cause of action against a 
junior use of a well-known foreign mark, the Second Circuit 
brought itself into direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit.  The 
Second Circuit decision also conflicts with the broader trend 
toward greater internationalization of strong intellectual 
property enforcement procedures and standards with continued 
national, rather than international, implementation and 
enforcement of those procedures and standards.14  In addition, 
the international trend is unquestionably toward increased 
minimum levels of substantive protection for intellectual 
property owners.15  The United States government strongly 
supports these trends, and it has even been accused of bullying 
other nations to increase their substantive protections.16  
Intellectual property protection is an area where the United 
States generally prefers to be at the forefront, rather than among 
the recalcitrant nations bringing up the rear. 
 
14 See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International 
Intellectual Property System, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION 
WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 1, 2–8 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007). 
15 Compare Paris Convention, supra note 6, arts. 4, 5bis, 6–10 (containing the 
minimum substantive trademark rights required under the Paris Convention), with 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 2(1), 15–21 (including in the TRIPS 
Agreement all of the Paris Convention minima for trademarks but adding further 
minimum substantive trademark rights); compare Paris Convention, supra note 6, 
arts. 4–5quater (containing the minimum substantive patent rights required under 
the Paris Convention), with TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 2(1), 27–34 
(including in the TRIPS Agreement all of the Paris Convention minima for patents 
but adding further minimum substantive patent rights); compare Berne Convention 
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, arts. 2, 2bis, 6bis, 8–16, Sept. 9, 
1886, revised July 24, 1967, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (containing 
the minimum substantive copyright rights required under the Berne Convention), 
with TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 9–14 (including in the TRIPS Agreement 
all of the Berne Convention minima for copyright except article 6bis but adding 
further minimum substantive copyright rights). 
16 See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC 
Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 323–31 (2006) (outlining a range of U.S. 
intellectual property negotiating activities that developing nations perceived to be 
coercive, particularly with respect to the incorporation of intellectual property 
protections within the GATT system upon formation of the World Trade 
Organization); see also Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual 
Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 139–40 (2000) 
(discussing the “Special 301” unilateral retaliation process instituted by the United 
States in 1989, which requires the United States Trade Representative to assess, 
cite, and eventually sanction countries, via trading duties or the like, when countries 
are argued to be out of compliance with their international intellectual property 
obligations in a way that harms U.S. trade interests). 
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The divergence of the Second Circuit from the Ninth Circuit 
and earlier favorable discussions of the well-known foreign 
marks doctrine in case law raises the very real question of 
whether the United States fully complies with its international 
obligations to protect well-known foreign marks.  If the Second 
Circuit has accurately assessed the scope of Lanham Act 
protection for foreign mark owners, the United States may not be 
in compliance unless state law fills the gaps in protection.  If the 
Second Circuit is wrong, on the other hand, then there is less 
cause for concern, as that decision would simply represent one 
aberrant judicial decision.17 
In this Article, I argue that the United States does, in fact, 
provide the required protection under the Lanham Act.  Although 
the implementation is not a model of clarity,18 current federal law 
provides protection for well-known foreign marks, allowing 
owners of well-known foreign marks to seek redress in the 
United States for infringing acts that occur in the United States.  
Part II of the Article explains the sources and content of the U.S. 
treaty obligations to protect well-known foreign marks.  Part III 
sets out a brief account of U.S. judicial decisions related to the 
protection of well-known marks.  Part IV of the Article explains 
how and why section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides the well-
known foreign mark protection required by U.S. treaty 
obligations.  Key to this analysis is the issue of territoriality 
within trademark law.  The Second Circuit decision 
acknowledges territoriality as fundamental to international 
trademark law.  But it misapplies an oversimplified domestic 
rule of thumb to the complex issue presented in lieu of 
conducting a deeper analysis of the plain statutory language and 
U.S. international obligations.  I also provide some limited 
guidance on how protection for well-known foreign marks should 
be applied and explain how that protection fits quite naturally 
within the traditional model of trademark protection in the 
United States.19  In so doing, I urge courts to integrate the 
 
17 It will be a more problematic aberrant decision than a district court decision 
would be, of course, since it will remain detrimental to foreign mark owners 
litigating within the Second Circuit until such time as the decision can be corrected 
by an en banc decision in another case or by the Supreme Court. 
18 As set forth in Part IV, infra, the available Lanham Act protection for well-
known foreign marks relies on the interaction of several statutory sections with 
underlying common law trademark principles. 
19 See infra Part IV. 
CP_Lockridge (Do Not Delete) 4/4/2011  2:14 PM 
2010] INT’L OBLIGATIONS IN U.S. TRADEMARK LAW 1353 
internationally agreed principles related to well-known marks 
within the broad scope of the unfair competition provision of 
section 43(a).  As a whole, this Article gives practitioners and 
courts a roadmap for providing owners of well-known foreign 
marks the protection that the United States has agreed to give to 
them and that both the owners and the consuming public 
deserve. 
II. U.S. TREATY OBLIGATIONS RELATED TO WELL-KNOWN 
TRADEMARKS 
Before continuing this Article, the reader is well-served by 
the definition of a few terms used here.  First, the reader should 
be aware that a “mark,” although roughly a “brand name,” is 
more specifically any word, name, symbol, or other device used in 
connection with goods or services to indicate the source of the 
goods or services and to identify and distinguish the goods or 
services from those of other traders.20  In the United States, 
rights may be created by use in commerce and registration of a 
mark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office21 or by use in 
commerce alone.22  Most countries, on the other hand, provide 
“trademark” protection only to registered marks, although they  
 
 
 
 
20 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining both “trademark” and “service 
mark”); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 15(1) (describing a protectable 
trademark). In certain more technical matters, there is a difference between 
trademarks—used for goods—and service marks, but for most purposes there is no 
difference under current law in the United States or elsewhere. Thus, the term 
“marks” is often used as a shorthand for both service marks and trademarks, and in 
many instances the term “trademark” is used to include both trademarks and 
service marks—for example, references to “trademark rights” include rights in either 
a service mark or a trademark. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining “mark”). 
21 A domestic trademark owner must use a mark in commerce before a 
registration may issue. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)–(d). An owner of a foreign 
registration in the owner’s home country may register that mark federally without 
placing the mark in use in commerce. See id. § 1126(e). State registration systems 
also exist in the United States, but many of these systems do little more than 
duplicate rights available through use alone. See Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Abolishing 
State Trademark Registrations (Working Paper). 
22 See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768–69 (1992) 
(“[I]t is common ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks 
and that the general principles qualifying a mark for registration under § 2 of the 
Lanham Act are for the most part applicable in determining whether an 
unregistered mark is entitled to protection under § 43(a).”). 
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may protect users of unregistered but distinctive trading 
symbols, or “brand names,” against confusingly similar third-
party uses under unfair competition laws.23 
Second, although courts often use “well known” and “famous” 
interchangeably with respect to the doctrine at issue here, I use, 
whenever possible, only “well known.”  A reference to “famous 
marks” can be confusing to readers familiar with other aspects of 
U.S. trademark law, specifically, the use of the term “famous” in 
the Lanham Act’s provision on trademark dilution.24  In order to 
avoid such confusion, I prefer “well-known marks.”  Moreover, 
the Paris Convention and other international agreements use the 
term “well known.”  Third, I use “foreign mark” and “well-known 
foreign mark” rather than simply “well-known mark” in order to 
acknowledge that the specific situation being addressed here 
involves a mark used in at least one foreign country but that has 
not become subject to protection in the United States by the more 
traditional means of domestic use or registration. 
In this Article, I refer to the users of marks as being “senior” 
or “junior” according to worldwide seniority, rather than 
according to domestic seniority.  Therefore, the owner of the 
foreign mark alleged to have been well known in the United 
States at the time the domestic use began is the “senior user,” 
while the user in the United States is the “junior user.”  I use 
this nomenclature even when all parties agree that the domestic 
“junior user” was the first party to use the mark in commerce 
within the United States, which would, in a purely domestic 
dispute, place that party in senior user status.  
Another key term and concept used in this Article is 
“territoriality.”  In trademark law, this term is generally utilized 
as a shorthand reference to the geographic or geopolitical areas 
where a mark is entitled to legal protection.  In international 
 
23 See 7 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, app. A5. 
24 Trademark dilution is a cause of action separate from a classic confusion-
based infringement claim. Under federal law, a dilution claim does not require proof 
of a likelihood of confusion, cf. supra note 9, but does require proof that some kind of 
association will arise as a result of the similarity between the famous mark and the 
challenged use. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)–(C). The Lanham Act only provides this 
broader protection to the owner of a “famous” mark. See id. § 1125(c)(1). A “famous” 
mark is defined in the Lanham Act as one that is “widely recognized by the general 
consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or 
services of the mark’s owner.” Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A). An infringement claim, on the 
other hand, is potentially available to any mark that is protectable. See Two Pesos, 
505 U.S. at 769; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a)–(b), 1125(a)(1)(A).  
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law, on the other hand, the term “territoriality” is used in 
connection with the presumptive jurisdictional principle used as 
a starting point for determining the scope of a country’s laws.  As 
a result, how “territoriality” should be defined and how the 
concept should be applied in relation to a matter of international 
trademark law depends on the context.  “Territoriality” is not a 
unitary concept in international trademark law:  One facet of 
“territoriality” refers to use-based rights in the United States,25 
while the other facet has primarily international political 
connotations.26  Courts have recently relied on the principle of 
“territoriality” in analyzing arguments for federal protection for 
well-known foreign marks, as shown in Part III.27  But as I 
explain later in this Article, the courts do not generally analyze 
the two separate facets of “territoriality”—the domestic and the 
international. 
Within U.S. domestic law, discussions of the territorial scope 
of rights refer to the geographic area within the United States 
where the user of a mark is entitled to exclude others from using 
the same or a confusingly similar mark.  In this context, the 
territorial limits are derived in large part from an analysis of the 
likelihood of confusion.28  Multiple uses of the same or similar 
marks, even for the same or similar goods and services, are 
tolerable and not in conflict when there is no likelihood of 
confusion arising from the simultaneous uses.  And this lack of 
confusion has been deemed to exist, in many or most cases, when  
 
 
25 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark 
Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 888 (2004); see also Graeme W. 
Austin, The Territoriality of United States Trademark Law, in 3 INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
235, 236–39 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (discussing the “domestic territoriality” of U.S. 
trademark law). 
26 See Dinwoodie, supra note 25; see also Austin, supra note 25, at 239–40 
(discussing the “international territoriality” of trademark law). 
27 See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 161–63 (2d Cir. 2007); Grupo 
Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2004). 
28 Although the basic common law priority rule is, and was, priority of 
appropriation—“first in time”—the Supreme Court confirmed a refinement to that 
rule almost a century ago. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 
90, 96–97, 100 (1918); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 (1916). 
The refinement provides that when two users operate in market remote from one 
another, each can validly acquire trademark rights in his or her separate market, so 
long as the second user to appropriate the mark did not act in bad faith. Hanover 
Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 415. 
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the two users of the mark would not have the same customers 
because the uses, and thus the customers, are geographically 
remote from one another.29 
In the context of international trademark protection, 
“territoriality” refers primarily to the basic principle that a 
nation cannot grant or enforce protection for a mark outside the 
territorial borders of that nation.  This political dimension to 
trademark territoriality derives ultimately from the territorial 
scope of each nation’s authority to govern.30  As a result, one who 
wishes to establish trademark rights in more than one nation 
must generally pursue those rights separately in each nation of 
interest.31  Perceived deficiencies in completely territorial 
schemes of trademark rights uncoordinated with one another in 
any way led, in part, to the development of the Paris 
Convention.32 
 
 
 
 
29 This “domestic” form of territoriality is discussed in greater detail in Part 
IV.C.1 infra. 
30 See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 291, 
299–300 (7th ed. 2008) (explaining territoriality as the most common basis for 
prescriptive jurisdiction in civil matters and noting that the territoriality of 
prescriptive, or legislative jurisdiction, derives from the territorial sovereignty of 
each nation). If a nation’s prescriptive power reaches only to the nation’s territorial 
borders, then the force of its legislation or its common law rules will apply only 
within that nation’s territory. In this way, each nation’s trademark laws—and thus 
trademark rights granted or recognized under those laws—are said to be territorial. 
31 There are exceptions to this nation-by-nation pursuit of rights, such as the 
possibility of obtaining a registration for a Community Trade Mark, which is an EU-
wide registration. And, as discussed extensively by Graeme Dinwoodie in a recent 
article, the generally territorially limited prescriptive reach of each nation’s laws 
does not of itself create an infallible or inflexible choice of law rule to be applied to 
any particular dispute with an international dimension. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, 
Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of 
Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711 (2009). 
32 Among the obligations of a member nation are commitments to provide 
limited temporal priority to certain applications filed by nationals of other member 
nations, see Paris Convention, supra note 6, art. 4, to register without changes 
certain trademarks previously registered in other member nations, id. art. 
6quinquies, and to regard each registered mark as existing independently of marks 
registered in other member nations, id. art. 6(3). 
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A. The Paris Convention 
The Paris Convention is the oldest major multilateral treaty 
designed to improve the international protection of trademark 
rights.33  Since 1925, it has required member nations to protect 
well-known foreign marks.34 
The Paris Convention’s major advance in international 
intellectual property relations was implementing the principle of 
national treatment within a treaty intended for widespread, 
rather than only limited or regional implementation.35  
Substantive rights obligations were minimal in the first 
incarnation of the treaty, but its coverage was not then, and is 
not now, limited to national treatment.  The Convention also 
obligates member nations to provide certain minimum 
substantive trademark rights to nationals of other member 
nations.36  One of those minimum substantive rights is the right 
of a foreign national to obtain protection against the use or 
registration of a mark in a member nation if the foreign 
national’s mark is well known, a third party registers or uses the 
mark for identical or similar goods, and the complained-of mark 
is liable to create confusion.37  The basic obligation is to allow an 
 
33 Id. Much ink has been spilled in the legal literature about the self-executing 
or non-self-executing nature of the Paris Convention. But with respect to the 
question specifically addressed in this Article, that issue falls somewhat to the side. 
In this Article, I focus on the case of a mark that is well known in the United States 
but not yet used or registered here. A minimalist interpretation of the Paris 
Convention does not create a requirement for protection of a well-known mark in the 
absence of use of the mark in the protecting country. See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 
25, at 912–13. Instead, a minimalist interpretation holds that the Paris Convention 
only mandates protection of a well-known mark in the absence of a registration, 
leaving room for a country to require use. See id. The Lanham Act’s provisions 
providing rights to unregistered marks that have been used in commerce would 
therefore comply with that minimum requirement set forth in the Paris Convention. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 
763, 768–69 (1992).  
34 See G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS 
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 89 (1968). 
35 See Paris Convention, supra note 6, art. 2. 
36 See id. arts. 5quinquies, 6bis(1), 6quater, 6quinquies, 6sexies, 7, 8, 10bis; see 
also BODENHAUSEN, supra note 34, at 30–31. 
37 See Paris Convention, supra note 6, art. 6bis. The full text of article 6bis is as 
follows: 
(1) The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio if their legislation so 
permits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the 
registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a 
reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a 
mark considered by the competent authority of the country of registration 
CP_Lockridge (Do Not Delete) 4/4/2011  2:14 PM 
1358 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1347   
“interested party” to intervene in a registration proceeding, to 
request cancellation of a registration, or to object to the use of a 
mark under certain conditions: (1) the mark is “a reproduction, 
an imitation, or a translation” of a well-known foreign mark, 
(2) the well-known mark and the mark being objected to are used 
for identical or similar goods, and (3) the domestic use is “liable 
to create confusion.”38  Well-known mark status is defined in the 
Paris Convention only by the following characterization: “a mark 
considered . . . to be well known in [a protecting] country as being 
already the mark of a [protected foreign national].”39  This only 
seems to mean that well-known status is to be determined by 
each nation on an individual basis and that renown on a global 
scale is not required.  No more specific scope is provided, nor is 
the standard for how much local knowledge of a mark would be 
required for the mark to be “well known” in a country where 
protection is sought. 
The United States fulfills its obligations under article 6bis 
for well-known foreign marks that have been either: (1) used in 
the United States and registered on the Principal Register40 or 
(2) used in the United States without registration but with 
protection as a common law trademark under section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act.41  But if the Second Circuit’s recent decision is 
 
or use to be well known in that country as being already the mark of a 
person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or 
similar goods. These provisions shall also apply when the essential part of 
the mark constitutes a reproduction of any such well-known mark or an 
imitation liable to create confusion therewith. 
(2) A period of at least five years from the date of registration shall be 
allowed for requesting the cancellation of such a mark. The countries of the 
Union may provide for a period within which the prohibition of use must be 
requested. 
(3) No time limit shall be fixed for requesting the cancellation or the 
prohibition of the use of marks registered or used in bad faith. 
Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id.  
40 I refer here to both use and registration, rather than registration alone, for 
the reasons explained in notes 253 and 256. 
41 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (stating that a mark cannot be registered with the 
Patent and Trademark Office if it “[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so 
resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade 
name previously used in the United States and not abandoned, as to be likely, when 
used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive”); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1057(b) (West 2011) (making a 
certificate of registration on the principal register “prima facie evidence of the 
validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the owner’s 
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correct and if the Paris Convention requires the United States to 
protect well-known foreign marks not used in this country, we 
fall short of full compliance.  Interestingly, the United States has 
advocated in both the distant42 and recent43 past in favor of such 
an obligation.  Moreover, many Paris Convention nations provide 
more extensive protection,44 even though many or even most of 
 
ownership of the mark, and of the owner’s exclusive right to use the registered mark 
in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the 
certificate”); 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (allowing for an opposition proceeding based on a 
belief by “[a]ny person . . . that he would be damaged by the registration of a mark 
upon the principal register”); id. § 1064 (allowing a cancellation proceeding to be 
filed by “any person who believes that he is or will be damaged . . . by the 
registration of a mark on the principal register”); id. § 1114(1) (Lanham Act section 
32’s protection for registered marks in a civil infringement proceeding); id. § 1125(a) 
(Lanham Act section 43(a)’s protection for any trademark, whether registered or 
unregistered, via a civil infringement proceeding). 
42 A 1958 Paris Convention revision conference included a proposal to revise the 
text to expressly oblige member nations to protect unused but well-known marks. 
See BODENHAUSEN, supra note 34, at 91. Although only two out of twenty-seven 
member nations voted against the proposal, see id. n.6, that minor opposition was 
sufficient to block the change because revising the Paris Convention requires a true 
consensus of the member nations. See id. at 164, 191–92. According to the record of 
that 1958 revision conference, the United States proposed the change to require 
protection of unused but well-known marks. See Union Internationale pour la 
Protection de la Propriété Industrielle, Actes de la Conférence Réunie a Lisbonne 
[Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and Their 
International Registration] art. 6bis, Oct. 31, 1958, 923 U.N.T.S. 205. And in light of 
the case law in 1958, persons responsible for determining the position of the United 
States at that conference could reasonably have thought that protection without 
domestic use was, in fact, the state of U.S. law. See infra Part III (discussing Maison 
Prunier v. Prunier’s Rest. & Café, Inc., 159 Misc. 551, 288 N.Y.S. 529 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
Cnty. 1936), and Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 757, 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1959)).  
43 In 1999, the United States joined a nonbinding, multilateral understanding 
on well-known marks, the World Intellectual Property Organization’s Joint 
Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks. 
See World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Joint Recommendation 
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, WIPO Doc. 833(E), 
Sept. 29, 1999 [hereinafter Joint Recommendation on Well-Known Marks], available 
at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/development_iplaw/pub833.htm. That instrument 
contains a provision prohibiting a standard for well-known status that would require 
domestic use. See infra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. According to Graeme 
Dinwoodie, the United States was “extremely active in negotiating” the Joint 
Recommendation. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Some Remarks on the Limits of 
Harmonization, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 596, 600 (2006).   
44 See, e.g., McDonald’s Corp. v. Joburgers Drive-Inn Rest., 1997 (1) SA 1 (SCA), 
at 18–20 (S. Afr.) (explaining that the term “well known” applies “not only [to] the 
mark itself but also [to] the nationality, domicile or place of business of the mark’s 
owner, and moreover the fact that the relevant country is a convention country”); see 
also Ryota Charles Goto, Note, De Facto Abandonment of Territoriality: Protection of 
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those nations typically do not provide any trademark-specific 
protection without registration.  Instead, many nations protect 
unregistered marks, in certain circumstances, by applying their 
broader laws against unfair competition.  The United States, on 
the other hand, has a long tradition of providing trademark 
protection without registration.45  So of all nations, one might 
think the United States should be at the forefront of a broad 
article 6bis obligation.46 
B. The TRIPS Agreement 
The TRIPS Agreement, the intellectual-property treaty 
concluded as one of the foundational agreements of the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”), includes all substantial obligations 
of the Paris Convention with respect to trademarks47 and 
expands upon them as well.48  For example, the signatory nations 
agreed to extend the Paris Convention well-known marks 
obligation to include service marks as well as trademarks.49  The 
 
(Not-So-)Well-Known Foreign Trademarks in Japan and the United States, 28 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 121, 127–41 (2004) (discussing at length Japanese 
protection for well-known foreign marks as well as Japanese protection against bad-
faith adoption of foreign marks even when not well known). Some nations provide 
protection through the direct application of article 6bis, while others have expressly 
and clearly provided the protection through national legislation. The means by 
which several nations implement protection for well-known marks is set forth in 
Frederick Mostert’s 1997 book on the subject. See FREDERICK W. MOSTERT, FAMOUS 
AND WELL-KNOWN MARKS 153–422 (1997) (providing information on Argentina, 
Australia, Benelux (the economic union through which Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Luxembourg share uniform trademark law), Brazil, Canada, China, France, 
Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore, South Africa, and the United Kingdom). 
The book also provides an assessment of the state of U.S. law on the subject as of 
1997, but as set forth in this Article, reevaluation of that position would be required 
in light of post-1997 case law. Id. 
45 See, e.g., Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (“The right to adopt and 
use a symbol or a device to distinguish the goods or property made or sold by the 
person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other persons, has been long 
recognized by the common law and the chancery courts of England and of this 
country, and by the statutes of some of the States.”). 
46 See, e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at 959–60 (observing that “U.S. law, as 
one of the few use-based systems in the world, would seem well suited to 
accommodate [an] approach [focusing on reach of goodwill and not just political 
boundaries]”). 
47 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 2(1). 
48 See id. arts. 15–21. 
49 See id. art. 16(2) (“Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, 
mutatis mutandis, to services. In determining whether a trademark is well-known, 
Members shall take account of the knowledge of the trademark in the relevant 
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TRIPS Agreement also expanded protection for well-known 
foreign marks beyond uses or registrations that would create a 
likelihood of confusion.50  TRIPS mandates protection against 
unauthorized use or registration with goods or services dissimilar 
from those associated with the well-known mark, provided that 
the use would indicate a connection with the foreign owner and 
would likely damage the interests of that owner.51 
The TRIPS Agreement did not define the term “well-known 
mark,” and, as noted above, the Paris Convention provides no 
firm meaning for “well known.”52  The TRIPS Agreement states 
only that member nations “shall take account of the knowledge of 
the trademark in the relevant sector of the public, including 
knowledge in the Member concerned which has been obtained as 
a result of the promotion of the trademark.”53  As a result, the 
exact meaning of “well-known mark” may continue to vary 
internationally, but certain contours are consistent.  Additional 
consistency within international application of the concept of a 
“well-known mark” may also arise from recent, although 
nonbinding, international negotiations. 
C. Post-TRIPS Developments 
The most recent, although nonbinding, multilateral effort to 
improve protection for well-known marks in foreign markets is 
the Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the 
Protection of Well-Known Marks (“Joint Recommendation on 
Well-Known Marks” or “Joint Recommendation”), which was 
negotiated through the World Intellectual Property 
Organization.54  For most nations, the Joint Recommendation on 
Well-Known Marks is simply an agreed but nonbinding 
 
sector of the public, including knowledge in the Member concerned which has been 
obtained as a result of the promotion of the trademark.”). 
50 See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text for the relevant portion of the 
Paris Convention. 
51 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 16(3) (“Article 6bis of the Paris 
Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to goods or services which are not 
similar to those in respect of which a trademark is registered, provided that use of 
that trademark in relation to those goods or services would indicate a connection 
between those goods or services and the owner of the registered trademark and 
provided that the interests of the owner of the registered trademark are likely to be 
damaged by such use.”). 
52 See Paris Convention, supra note 6. 
53 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 16(2). 
54 See Joint Recommendation on Well-Known Marks, supra note 43.  
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recommendation on well-known marks.  The United States, 
however, has bound itself to observe the Joint Recommendation 
through at least one bilateral agreement, a free trade agreement 
with Singapore.55  And in light of the most-favored-nation 
treatment provision in the TRIPS Agreement,56 the United States 
must now provide to the nationals of all WTO member nations 
the advantages provided to Singaporean nationals under the 
binding bilateral agreement.57 
The Joint Recommendation lists the following factors for the 
analysis of a well-known mark:  
1. the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in the 
relevant sector of the public; 
2. the duration, extent, and geographical area of any use of the 
mark; 
3. the duration, extent and geographical area of any promotion 
of the mark, including advertising or publicity and the 
presentation, at fairs or exhibitions, of the goods and/or services 
to which the mark applies; 
4. the duration and geographical area of any registrations, 
and/or any applications for registration, of the mark, to the 
extent that they reflect use or recognition of the mark;  
 
55 See Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., arts. 16.1(2)(b)(i), 16.2(4), May 6, 2003, 
42 I.L.M. 1026 [hereinafter U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement] (containing a 
commitment to “give effect” to articles 1–6 of the Joint Recommendation on Well-
Known Marks and a provision nearly identical to article 16(3) of the TRIPS 
Agreement: “Article 6bis of the Paris Convention . . . shall apply, mutatis mutandis, 
to goods or services that are not similar to those identified by a well-known 
trademark, whether registered or not, provided that use of that trademark in relation 
to those goods or services would indicate a connection between those goods or 
services and the owner of the trademark and provided that the interests of the 
owner of the trademark are likely to be damaged by such use.” (second emphasis 
added)); see also Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Jordan, art. 4(1)(a), Oct. 24, 2000, 2000 
U.S.T. LEXIS 160 (similar to provision in agreement with Singapore). The United 
States also incorporated the Joint Recommendation into a nonbinding free trade 
agreement with Chile. See Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 17.2(9), June 6, 
2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 [hereinafter U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2011) (“recogniz[ing] the importance of” the Joint Recommendation 
on Well-Known Marks and agreeing to be “guided by [its] principles”). 
56 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, art. 4 (“With regard to the protection of 
intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a 
Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members.”). 
57 See Dinwoodie, supra note 43, at 603–04 (noting that the binding bilateral 
agreements of the United States will, through the most-favored-nation obligation of 
TRIPS, heighten U.S. obligations to all WTO members). 
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5. the record of successful enforcement of rights in the mark, in 
particular, the extent to which the mark was recognized as well 
known by competent authorities;  
6. the value associated with the mark.58 
Countries guided by the Joint Recommendation on Well-
Known Marks will look to whether the foreign mark is well 
known in at least one relevant sector of the public in that 
country.59  Relevant sectors of the public include: 
(i) actual and/or potential consumers of the type of goods and/or 
services to which the mark applies; 
(ii) persons involved in channels of distribution of the type of 
goods and/or services to which the mark applies; 
(iii) business circles dealing with the type of goods and/or 
services to which the mark applies.60 
Perhaps most important for purposes of this Article, 
however, is the following provision, which sets forth factors that 
“shall not” be used when determining if a foreign mark is well-
known: 
(a) A Member State shall not require, as a condition for 
determining whether a mark is a well-known mark: 
(i) that the mark has been used in, or that the mark has 
been registered or that an application for registration of the 
mark has been filed in or in respect of, the Member State; 
(ii) that the mark is well known in, or that the mark has 
been registered or that an application for registration of the 
mark has been filed in or in respect of, any jurisdiction 
other than the Member State; or 
(iii) that the mark is well known by the public at large in 
the Member State.61 
The United States, in joining the Joint Recommendation, has 
quite clearly entered into a group of nations that officially profess 
to protect well-known foreign marks without domestic use and 
that advocate for such protection.  And as noted above, because 
these provisions are expressly binding in at least one bilateral 
 
58 Joint Recommendation on Well-Known Marks, supra note 43, art. 2(1)(b). 
59 Id. art. 2(2)(b) (“Where a mark is determined to be well known in at least one 
relevant sector of the public in a Member State, the mark shall be considered by the 
Member State to be a well-known mark.”). 
60 Id. art. 2(2)(a). 
61 Id. art. 2(3). 
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agreement, the obligations of the United States to all WTO 
member nations have now been heightened.62 
By providing factors to guide domestic decision makers, the 
Joint Recommendation certainly advanced common 
understanding related to, and was aimed at leveling the 
international playing field with respect to, enforcement of the 
well-known foreign marks doctrine.  But even with these agreed 
factors, there is no agreed standard that a country’s decision 
makers are obligated to apply in judging these factors.  Exactly 
how deep or broad knowledge of a mark must be within that 
country for the mark to be “well known” within the meaning of 
the Joint Recommendation, the TRIPS Agreement, or the Paris 
Convention remains internationally undefined. 
The absence of an international standard when a mark is 
“well known” means that the United States may set a relatively 
high standard.  It may not, however, refuse altogether to 
recognize or to apply the doctrine.  Recent decisions within the 
Second Circuit may frustrate the policies and obligations 
established and accepted by the executive and legislative 
branches with respect to well-known foreign marks.63  These 
 
62 While binding as between the contracting nations, neither the bilateral free 
trade agreements nor the TRIPS Agreement is directly effective in U.S. law. See, 
e.g., United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 
No. 108-78, § 102(a), 117 Stat. 948, 950 (2003); Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 
Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102(a), 108 Stat. 4809, 4815 (1994); S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 13 
(1994), available at http://finance.senate.gov/library/reports/committee/ 
index.cfm?PageNum_rs=8. Nevertheless, courts should proceed with caution before 
construing U.S. domestic law in a manner inconsistent with our international 
obligations. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 
(1804). 
63 See OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., USTR STRATEGIC PLAN, FY 2007–2012, at 14 
(2008), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ asset_upload_file 
726_14695.pdf (citing U.S. judicial decisions generally as one of the external factors 
influencing its ability to monitor and enforce U.S. rights under international 
agreements). The administrative branch of the U.S. government quite clearly desires 
to maintain and encourage high levels of international protection for well-known 
U.S. marks. See, e.g., OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2009 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE 
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 102, 253, 339–40, 421, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/reports/2009/NTE/asset_upload_file40
5_15451.pdf (commenting on protection of well-known marks in China, Indonesia, 
Mexico, and Russia); OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2008 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE 
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 51, 110–11, 470, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/reports/2008/NTE/asset_upload_file36
5_14652.pdf (commenting on protection of well-known marks in Cambodia, China, 
and Russia); OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2007 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT 
ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 52, 159–60, 291–92, 325, 327, 498–99, 541, available 
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judicial decisions do not conclusively establish noncompliance by 
the United States, as there are also other decisions protecting 
well-known foreign marks and a strong statutory argument to 
support Lanham Act protection.  In the remainder of this Article, 
I demonstrate that despite the Second Circuit’s pronouncement 
to the contrary, U.S. law does protect well-known marks through 
the Lanham Act in a way that fully complies with international 
obligations and even the nonbinding Joint Recommendation.64 
 
at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/reports/2007/NTE/asset_upload_file 
855_10945.pdf (commenting on protection of well-known marks in Cambodia, Costa 
Rica, Indonesia, Japan, Russia, and Singapore); OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2006 
NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 121–22, 365, 367, 
555, available at http://ustraderep.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_ 
Publications/2006/2006_NTE_Report/ asset_upload_file929_9220.pdf (commenting 
on protection of well-known marks in China, Japan, and Russia); see also OFFICE OF 
U.S. TRADE REP., 2008 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 76, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file 192_15258.pdf 
(“The United States also remains concerned about a variety of weaknesses in 
China’s legal framework that do not effectively deter, and may even encourage, 
certain types of infringing activity, such as the ‘squatting’ of foreign company names, 
designs and trademarks . . . . The United States has continued to discuss these and 
other problems with China and seek solutions for them. In a positive development, 
SAIC announced in August 2007 that it was launching a 6-month campaign 
targeting the unauthorized use of well-known trademarks and company names in 
the enterprise registration process.”); OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., 2007 SPECIAL 301 
REPORT 48, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file 
230_11122.pdf (“The U.S. Government commends the Suzhou Intermediate Court 
for recognizing the Kodak well-known trademark status in a court case involving the 
Kodak name.”).  
64 Another long-standing international agreement, which creates for the United 
States significant trademark-related obligations potentially useful for owners of 
certain well-known foreign marks, is the General Inter-American Convention for 
Trade Mark and Commercial Protection (the “Pan-American Convention”). See 
General Inter-American Convention for Trade Mark and Commercial Protection, 
Feb. 20, 1929, 46 Stat. 2907 [hereinafter Pan-American Convention]. The Pan-
American Convention, which has been somewhat, but not entirely, eclipsed by the 
TRIPS Agreement, has as its current member nations the United States, Colombia, 
Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. See 
Bacardi Corp. of Am. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 157 n.7 (1940). Under article 7 of 
the Pan-American Convention, which is self-executing in the United States, owners 
of a mark protected in one member nation may challenge the use and registration of 
conflicting trademarks in another member nation upon proof that the junior user, 
applicant, or registrant of the mark in question had knowledge of the existence and 
continuous use of the senior owner’s use of the mark in the same class of goods. See 
id. at 161. 
Any owner of a mark protected in one of the Contracting States in 
accordance with its domestic law, who may know that some other person is 
using or applying to register or deposit an interfering mark in any other of 
the Contracting States, shall have the right to oppose such use, registration 
or deposit and shall have the right to employ all legal means, procedure or 
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III. A HISTORY OF WELL-KNOWN FOREIGN MARKS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Through 2004, U.S. courts uniformly recognized that well-
known foreign marks not used in this country could be protected 
here from confusingly similar registrations and unauthorized 
uses.  Until then, direct recognition of rights in well-known 
foreign marks had been most clearly embodied in two New York 
State trial court decisions from 1936 and 1959.  Those decisions 
applied unfair competition and misappropriation doctrines to 
allow relief to owners of well-known foreign marks.  The doctrine 
was not referred to as such in those cases, nor did those courts 
refer to article 6bis of the Paris Convention.65  
 
recourse provided in the country in which such interfering mark is being 
used or where its registration or deposit is being sought, and upon proof 
that the person who is using such mark or applying to register or deposit it, 
had knowledge of the existence and continuous use in any of the 
Contracting States of the mark on which opposition is based upon goods of 
the same class, the opposer may claim for himself the preferential right to 
use such mark in the country where the opposition is made or priority to 
register or deposit it in such country, upon compliance with the 
requirements established by the domestic legislation in such country and 
by this Convention. 
Pan-American Convention, supra, art. 7. The Pan-American Convention does not 
deal explicitly with well-known foreign marks, but it does provide an avenue for 
certain owners of foreign marks to obtain relief in the United States against the 
knowing use of a conflicting mark. This means that owners of well-known foreign 
marks used and protected in a member nation of the Pan-American Convention 
have, as a practical matter, greater rights to object to conflicting U.S. uses than do 
owners of marks used and protected elsewhere in the world. The Trademark Trial 
and Appeal Board has held that the Pan-American Convention provides an 
additional basis in U.S. trademark law for certain foreign trademark owners—those 
meeting the requirements of the Convention—to maintain or defend an inter partes 
opposition or cancellation proceeding with the Patent and Trademark Office. See 
Diaz v. Servicios De Franquicia Pardo’s S.A.C., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1320, 1324–26 
(T.T.A.B. 2007) (holding that article 7 of the Pan-American Convention can be used 
to establish the affirmative defense of priority in a trademark within the context of 
an opposition); British-Am. Tobacco Co. v. Phillip Morris Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1585, 1589–90 (T.T.A.B. 2000) (holding that article 8 of the Pan-American 
Convention provides an independent basis for a petition to cancel a registered 
mark); see also Corp. Cimex, S.A. v. DM Enter. & Distrib., Inc., 2008 WL 5078739, at 
*2 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (granting summary judgment to a Cuban opposer in an opposition 
based on section 7 of the Pan-American Convention). 
65 The first case did refer to article 10bis of the Paris Convention, which states 
that member nations must provide “effective protection against unfair competition.” 
See Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Rest. & Cafe, Inc., 159 Misc. 551, 554, 288 N.Y.S. 
529, 532 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1936). 
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A. Case Law Through 2004 
In Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Restaurant & Café, Inc.,66 a 
New York court granted relief to the owner of a mark alleged to 
have “developed international fame.”67  The mark, “Prunier,” had 
been in continuous use in Paris, France for restaurant services 
from 1872 through the time of the case in 1936.68  The senior user 
had no operations in the United States.69  The restaurants, which 
operated under the name “Prunier” and “Maison Prunier,” 
specialized in seafood.70  The junior user had opened a restaurant 
in New York City under the name “Prunier’s Restaurant & Café, 
Inc.” with menus carrying the legend “The Famous French Sea 
Food Restaurant.”71  The trial court issued a temporary 
injunction against the junior use, although the senior use was 
exclusively foreign.72 
In Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc.,73 the New York trial court 
issued a permanent injunction to protect the senior user’s 
“Maxim’s” mark, used for a restaurant in Paris, from a junior use 
of the same name for a New York City restaurant.74  As stated by 
the court, “There is no doubt as to [the Paris restaurant’s] unique 
and eminent position as a restaurant of international fame and 
prestige.  It is, of course, well known in this country, particularly 
to the class of people residing in the cosmopolitan city of New 
York who dine out.”75  The senior user had a registration in the 
United States for catering services and wines, but the 
 
66 159 Misc. 551, 288 N.Y.S. 529. 
67 Id. at 552, 288 N.Y.S. at 530. 
68 Id. 
69 See id. at 553, 288 N.Y.S. at 530–31. 
70 Id. at 552, 288 N.Y.S. at 530. The current online restaurant guides for Paris 
indicate that a restaurant called “Maison Prunier,” which features an oyster bar, 
continues to operate there. See Zagat Survey LLC, Paris Restaraunts Maison 
Prunier, http://www.zagat.com/Verticals/PropertyDetails.aspx?VID=8&R=69730 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2011). 
71 Maison Prunier, 159 Misc. at 553–54, 288 N.Y.S. at 531 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
72 Id. at 559, 288 N.Y.S. at 538. 
73 20 Misc. 2d 757, 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1959). 
74 Id. at 758, 760, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 334, 336. The defendant also used a similar 
color scheme for its décor and imitated a particular script printing of the name 
“Maxim’s” on an awning, over the door, and in advertising. See id. at 758, 193 
N.Y.S.2d at 334. The script appears to remain the same even today. See, e.g., U.S. 
Trademark Reg. No. 580,091 (filed Mar. 20, 1952); Maxim’s, http://www.maxims-de-
paris.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2011). 
75 Vaudable, 20 Misc. 2d at 758, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 334. 
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registration did not appear to weigh significantly in the court’s 
decision.76  In enjoining the domestic use, the court emphasized 
the defendant junior user’s apparent intent to appropriate the 
widespread goodwill that the plaintiffs had built up in the 
“Maxim’s” name.77 
As noted above, these New York cases did not rely on federal 
trademark law or the Paris Convention’s obligation related to 
well-known marks, a point emphasized by the Second Circuit in 
refusing to recognize federal protection in 2007.78  Failure to refer 
to the Lanham Act in the Maison Prunier case is, of course, 
completely irrelevant in light of the fact that the Lanham Act 
became effective in 1947, eight years after the decision.  And 
Vaudable, decided only twelve years after the Lanham Act 
shifted the emphasis within U.S. trademark law from the state to 
the federal level, had no need to make a specific citation to 
federal law.  The court was able to rely almost entirely on New 
York state case law, specifically Maison Prunier.79  Vaudable did 
refer to the Lanham Act generally to support its statement that 
“[t]he trend of the law, both statutory and decisional, has been to 
extend the scope of the doctrine of unfair competition.”80  
The doctrine recognizing well-known foreign marks 
remained relatively dormant for over forty years, with sporadic 
references in the decisions of the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board (“TTAB”) and other cases where it was mentioned by a 
court in passing.  But the doctrine was generally not relied on by 
any party to the case, and it did not form the sole basis of any of 
the decisions.81  For example, a 1983 TTAB decision declined to 
recognize priority in a senior foreign user of a mark as against a 
domestic, good-faith junior user, “at least unless it can be shown 
that the foreign party’s mark was, at the time of the adoption 
and first use of a similar mark by the first user in the United 
 
76 See id. 
77 Id. at 758–59, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 334–35. 
78 See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007). 
79 See Vaudable, 20 Misc. 2d at 759, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 335. 
80 Id. 
81 See, e.g., Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 102–07 (2d Cir. 1998); 
Person’s Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1570–72 (Fed. Cir. 1990); First Niagara 
Ins. Brokers Inc. v. First Niagara Fin. Group Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1334, 1345–
46 (T.T.A.B. 2005), overruled on other grounds by First Niagara Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. 
First Niagara Fin. Group, Inc., 476 F.3d 867 (Fed. Cir. 2007); All England Lawn 
Tennis Club, Ltd. v. Creations Aromatiques, Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1069, 1072 
(T.T.A.B. 1983).  
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States, a ‘famous’ mark within the meaning of Vaudable v. 
Montmartre, Inc.”82  The marks in that case were not alleged to 
have been “famous” or “well known” or otherwise to have a 
significant consumer reputation, so the TTAB did not further 
address the issue.  Another 1983 TTAB decision rested on two 
bases: first, that opposer, All England Lawn Tennis Club, owned 
a U.S. registration for the mark WIMBLEDON for wearing 
apparel and that the applicant’s proposed mark would create a 
likelihood of confusion with that registered mark, and second, 
that opposer had acquired rights in the term WIMBLEDON in 
the United States in connection with its annual tennis 
championship and that the term had acquired “fame and 
notoriety [in the United States] . . . within the meaning of 
Vaudable.”83 
B. Case Law from 2004 to the Present 
In late 2004, the Ninth Circuit issued the first in a flurry of 
well-known foreign marks decisions.  Its decision allowed a 
foreign senior user of a mark to assert priority over a domestic 
junior user of a mark by relying on the mark’s well-known status, 
based on use outside the United States, as of the time of adoption 
of the mark by the junior user.84  Grupo Gigante operated a 
grocery-store chain in Mexico under the store name “Gigante.”85  
The chain expanded from one Mexico City store in 1962 to almost 
one hundred stores by 1991.86  Six stores were in the Baja area of 
Mexico, and two of those stores were in Tijuana, located on the 
U.S.-Mexican border near San Diego, California.87  The Mexican 
company operated no stores in the United States before 1999.88 
 
82 Mother’s Rests. Inc. v. Mother’s Other Kitchen, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
1046, 1048 (T.T.A.B. 1983). A second opinion in that case, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, opined that “application of the well-known marks doctrine 
depends upon whether the applicable text of the Paris Convention, in this case, the 
1934 London text, and, in particular, Article 6bis of that Convention, is self-
executing,” although the opinion agreed that the marks in question had never been 
well known in the United States. Id. at 1051–52 (Allen, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
83 All England Lawn Tennis Club, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1071–72. 
84 See Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 
2004).  
85 Id. at 1091. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1092. 
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In mid-1991, Michael Dallo opened a grocery store in San 
Diego called “Gigante Market,” and in 1996, he and his brother 
Chris opened a second area store under the same name.89  In 
1998 and 1999, the Dallos and Grupo Gigante began their legal 
skirmish, and Grupo Gigante sued for trademark infringement.90  
The Ninth Circuit, upon reviewing the district court’s judgment 
recognizing potential rights in a well-known foreign mark, began 
by holding that the well-known marks doctrine did exist in the 
United States: 
We hold . . . that there is a famous mark exception [which the 
Ninth Circuit equated with a well-known mark exception] to the 
territoriality principle.  While the territoriality principle is a 
long-standing and important doctrine within trademark law, it 
cannot be absolute.  An absolute territoriality rule without a 
famous-mark exception would promote consumer confusion and 
fraud.  Commerce crosses borders.  In this nation of immigrants, 
so do people.  Trademark is, at its core, about protecting against 
consumer confusion and “palming off.”  There can be no 
justification for using trademark law to fool immigrants into 
thinking that they are buying from the store they liked back 
home.91 
The Ninth Circuit did not specify where in the rather large body 
of federal trademark law it located this protection.92 
In applying the exception for a well-known mark, allowing 
the foreign senior user of the mark to assert priority over a 
domestic junior user, the Ninth Circuit set what might be termed 
a “secondary meaning plus” standard for which marks could be 
protected in the United States as well-known foreign marks.93  It 
 
89 Id. at 1091. 
90 Id. at 1092. 
91 Id. at 1094. 
92 It did rely, almost certainly, on federal law, since it expressly rejected the 
plaintiff’s alternative arguments based on California state law and on the Paris 
Convention. It stated that a direct claim under article 6bis would be duplicative of 
the Lanham Act claim. Id. at 1099. 
93 “Secondary meaning” means that consumers in the relevant market—whether 
the market is defined by geography or types of goods or services or some other form 
of market segmentation—see a word, name, or symbol used in connection with goods 
or services and think first of the brand or source significance of the mark rather 
than the primary, or “dictionary” or other common meaning, of a word, name, or 
symbol. See Amazing Spaces, Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage, 608 F.3d 225, 237 (5th Cir. 
2010). Some authorities prefer to refer to secondary meaning by the term “acquired 
distinctiveness” in order to more clearly differentiate this type of trademark 
distinctiveness from “inherent distinctiveness.” See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
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held that “where the mark has not before been used in the 
American market, the court must be satisfied, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that a substantial percentage of 
consumers in the relevant American market is familiar with the 
foreign mark.”94  The court expressly limited the relevant 
American market to the geographic area of the defendant’s 
allegedly infringing use.95  The concurring opinion in Grupo 
Gigante agreed with the legal standard announced, but it also 
explained in some detail why the evidence available in the case 
did not meet that standard.  The concurring judge believed that 
for the grocery store services at issue, survey evidence related 
only to “Spanish-speaking [persons who] had recently purchased 
Mexican-style food at a supermarket or other food store”—the 
only survey presented by the senior user—would never be 
sufficient because the survey emphasized the target market of 
Spanish-speaking grocery purchasers rather than the general 
category of the service provided, namely, retail grocery store 
services.96  Moreover, the concurring judge carefully set forth his 
view that a majority of the junior user’s customers and potential 
customers must be familiar with the foreign mark before well-
known status can be found for that foreign mark.97 
 
 
Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 205–06 (2000). Marks that are inherently 
distinctive are protected under U.S. law from the time of use or registration, while 
non-inherently distinctive marks are not protected until they develop secondary 
meaning or acquired distinctiveness among consumers through use in the relevant 
market. See Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. TD Banknorth, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 77, 
84 (D. Mass. 2008). There is no specific standard for the level of familiarity required 
among consumers before secondary meaning will be found by the courts or the 
trademark office. 
94 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1098. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1107 (Graber, J., concurring) (quoting Grupo Gigante S.A. de C.V. v. 
Dallo & Co., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1093 (C.D. Cal. 2000)). 
97 Id. at 1108. In the case, despite the Ninth Circuit’s leaving open the 
possibility that the plaintiff’s “Gigante” mark could be found to have been well 
known, the victory was only partial for Grupo Gigante. The court also applied the 
doctrine of laches to refuse to grant an injunction against the use of the “Gigante 
Market” mark at the two existing Dallo locations. See id. at 1101–05 (majority 
opinion). The remaining open issue was whether the plaintiff, owner of the foreign 
mark, would be able to enjoin the Dallos from opening a future location. See id. at 
1093.  
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Also in 2004, the Southern District of New York held that 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act98 provided protection to the 
owner of a foreign mark that was well known in the United 
States as of the time of the defendant’s adoption of the mark.99  
In Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp.,100 although a 
Cuban cigar manufacturer was the senior user of the mark 
“Cohiba,” a domestic junior user had registered the mark in the 
United States and had used it in connection with cigars at 
various times over a fifteen-year period before the immediate 
legal dispute had begun in earnest.101  The court referenced the 
common law “well-known” or “famous marks” doctrine as well as 
article 6bis of the Paris Convention, and it declared that the 6bis 
rights were “subsumed by federal and common law.”102  The court 
referenced Vaudable and TTAB decisions referencing Vaudable, 
as well as the treatise McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition, to determine that “Cubatabaco need only show that 
the COHIBA mark had a ‘known reputation’ to premium cigar 
smokers” at the time of the defendant’s adoption of the mark.103  
The court then looked to the World Intellectual Property 
Organization’s Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on 
the Protection of Well-Known Marks104 for guidance in applying a 
standard for well-known marks to the facts before it.105  Upon 
deciding that the “Cohiba” mark was well known, or famous, 
within the meaning of the doctrine, it found that the plaintiff 
senior user had a protectable right in the mark at the relevant 
 
98 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). Section 43(a) provides, in relevant part, that the 
use in commerce, 
on or in connection with any goods or services, . . . [of] any word, term, 
name, symbol, or device . . . which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such 
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of 
his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, 
[provides a civil cause of action to] any person who believes that he or she is 
or is likely to be damaged by such act.  
Id. 
99 See Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8399, 2004 WL 
602295, at *30 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2004). 
100 Id. at *1. 
101 See id. 
102 Id. at *30 (quoting Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., No. 97 Civ. 
8399, 2002 WL 31251005, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2002)). 
103 Id. at *33–34. 
104 See supra notes 54–64 and accompanying text. 
105 Empresa Cubana del Tabaco, 2004 WL 602295, at *34–35. 
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time, and it proceeded to apply a standard likelihood of confusion 
analysis under section 43(a).106  The court found the junior use 
likely to cause confusion and cancelled the junior user’s 
registration.107  
When the Empresa Cubana case reached the Second Circuit, 
however, the senior user’s victory proved short-lived.  Although 
the court recognized and left open the possibility that well-known 
foreign marks were protected in the United States, it barred 
Cubatabaco, the plaintiff in the case, from using the doctrine to 
acquire trademark rights in the United States, basing its 
decision on the Cuban embargo regulations, stating 
Cubatabaco may be correct that Sections 44(b) and (h) 
incorporate article 6bis and allow foreign entities to acquire 
U.S. trademark rights in the United States if their marks are 
sufficiently famous in the United States before they are used in 
this country.  That is the view expressed by some 
commentators . . . . 
However, we need not decide that broad question here because 
even assuming that the famous marks doctrine is otherwise 
viable and applicable, the embargo bars Cubatabaco from 
acquiring property rights in the U.S. COHIBA mark through 
the doctrine.108 
In two separate 2005 decisions, the Southern District of New 
York again served as the forum for the question of protecting 
well-known marks in the United States.  The court in ITC Ltd. v. 
Punchgini, Inc.109 assumed without deciding that such protection 
was available.110  It then stated that at a minimum, the owner of 
a foreign mark alleged to be well known in the United States 
must demonstrate that the mark had secondary meaning for the 
foreign owner in the United States market at the time the junior 
use began.111  The court determined that the senior user of the 
“Bukhara” mark for restaurant services had not demonstrated 
the existence of secondary meaning in the relevant market of 
 
106 Id. at *39. 
107 Id. 
108 Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 480–81 (2d Cir. 
2005) (citations omitted). 
109 373 F. Supp. 2d 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 518 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2008). 
110 See id. at 287. 
111 See id. The court also noted that the recent Ninth Circuit decision in Grupo 
Gigante would require more familiarity among the consuming public than mere 
secondary meaning. See id. at 288. 
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New York City.112  The court therefore denied the claims based on 
the alleged status of the mark as a well-known foreign mark.113  
The court also found that although the senior user possessed a 
U.S. registration for its mark and had previously owned U.S. 
trademark rights based on use of the mark in U.S. commerce, it 
had abandoned its U.S. rights after closing the restaurants for 
which the mark was used.114 
Six months later, in Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat 
Market, Inc.,115 another judge in the same district expressly held 
that federal trademark law does not protect well-known foreign 
marks: 
To the extent the doctrine is a creature of common law it may 
support state causes of action, but it has no place in federal law 
where Congress has enacted a statute, the Lanham Act, that 
carefully prescribes the bases for federal trademark claims.  The 
Lanham Act nowhere specifies the well-known or famous marks 
doctrine.116  
 
112 See id. at 288–89. 
113 See id. at 290–91. 
114 See id. at 284–85. 
115 381 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
116 Id. at 327 (citations omitted). The Almacenes Exito Court relied on the 
Empresa Cubana Second Circuit opinion in rejecting the argument that section 44(b) 
of the Lanham Act incorporated article 6bis protection for domestically unused 
marks. See id. at 328. This was, quite simply, an incorrect application of the Second 
Circuit’s Empresa Cubana opinion—although it ultimately accurately predicted the 
Second Circuit’s later holding in ITC. In Empresa Cubana, the Second Circuit had 
rejected an argument by the plaintiff seeking an expanded right against unfair 
competition based on Paris Convention article 10bis—not based on 6bis. See 
Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 484–85 (2d Cir. 2005). 
The Second Circuit expressly left open the possibility that protection would be 
available for well-known foreign marks. See id. at 480–81. 
 Section 44(b) provides that nationals of Paris Convention member states “shall 
be entitled to the benefits of . . . section [44] under the conditions expressed herein to 
the extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or 
reciprocal law, in addition to the rights to which any owner of a mark is otherwise 
entitled by this chapter.” 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b) (2006) (emphasis added). In rejecting a 
separate unfair competition claim based on article 10bis of the Paris Convention, as 
incorporated by section 44(b) and section 44(h) of the Lanham Act, the Second 
Circuit in Empresa Cubana focused on the lack of particular substantive standards 
for a broad unfair competition claim within the Lanham Act, which itself only covers 
certain types of unfair competition (primarily trademark infringement and false 
advertising). See Empresa Cubana, 399 F.3d at 484–85. Thus, the court’s reasoning 
in the article 10bis context cannot be applied to the question of Lanham Act 
implementation of article 6bis, which is expressly a trademark-related claim. 
Cubatabaco cannot maintain a claim for unfair competition under Article 
10bis of the Paris convention pursuant to Sections 44(b) and (h) of the 
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Although the court rejected a federal claim, it allowed the foreign 
senior user to proceed with its New York state law claims, 
relying on Maison Prunier.117 
When the Second Circuit reached its initial decision in the 
ITC appeal in 2007, it ended most, although not all, doubt as to 
the state of the law in that circuit as to well-known foreign 
marks.118  ITC lost its effort to obtain federal protection for its 
Bukhara mark at the district court level for two main reasons:  
(1) The court had determined that ITC abandoned through non-
use its U.S. priority based on its registered mark, and (2) the 
court did not believe the mark met the standard for a well-known 
foreign mark.119  The Second Circuit confirmed the abandonment  
 
 
 
 
Lanham Act. The Paris Convention requires that “foreign nationals . . . be 
given the same treatment in each of the member countries as that country 
makes available to its own citizens.” “[T]he Paris Convention provides for 
national treatment and does not define the substantive law of unfair 
competition.” As the Eleventh Circuit has explained: 
We agree that section 44 of the Lanham Act incorporated, to some 
degree, the Paris Convention. But we disagree that the Paris 
Convention creates substantive rights beyond those independently 
provided in the Lanham Act. As other courts of appeals have noted, the 
rights articulated in the Paris Convention do not exceed the rights 
conferred by the Lanham Act. Instead, we conclude that the Paris 
Convention, as incorporated by the Lanham Act, only requires 
‘national treatment.’ 
. . . Plaintiff may seek protection in United States courts for violations 
of the Lanham Act. But the Paris Convention, as incorporated by 
section 44 of the Lanham Act, creates no new cause of action for unfair 
competition. Any cause of action based on unfair competition must be 
grounded in the substantive provisions of the Lanham Act. 
Empresa Cubana, 399 F.3d at 484–85 (quoting Int’l Café, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Café 
Int’l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1277–78 (11th Cir. 2001)) (citations omitted). 
117 See Almacenes Exito, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 328. In Almacenes Exito, the junior 
user adopted a precise copy of the senior user’s EXITO mark—including design 
features. Id. at 326. The senior user operated the largest retail superstore chain in 
Colombia, as well as stores in Venezuela. Id. The junior user applied the mark to 
local supermarkets—featuring Latin American produce—in upper Manhattan and 
the Bronx, in predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods. Id. 
118 For another case involving claims of well-known status, see DeBeers LV 
Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
119 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 275, 285–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), 
aff’d, 518 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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finding.120  It also refused to allow ITC recourse to the well-
known foreign mark doctrine to obtain a different form of 
trademark priority over the defendants with respect to the 
Bukhara mark.121 
In refusing to follow the only appellate decision on point, the 
Second Circuit accurately observed, “[i]n Grupo Gigante, the 
Ninth Circuit did not reference either the language of the 
Lanham Act nor [sic] Article 6bis of the Paris Convention to 
support recognition of the famous marks doctrine.”122  The court 
concluded that the Ninth Circuit had rested its decision solely on 
“sound policy.”123 
Then, following a review of the recent Southern District of 
New York decisions on the well-known foreign marks doctrine, 
the Second Circuit endorsed the approach of the Almacenes Exito 
Court.124  In that decision, the well-known foreign marks doctrine 
was deemed to be an unacceptably “radical change in basic 
federal trademark law” due to its conflict with “the territoriality 
principle [which is] ‘a bedrock principle of federal trademark 
law.’ ”125 
The court appeared to be most convinced by its own reading 
of section 44 of the Lanham Act:  
[W]e do not ourselves discern in the plain language of sections 
44(b) and (h) a clear congressional intent to incorporate a 
famous marks exception into federal unfair competition law.  
Section 44(b) guarantees foreign mark holders only “the benefits 
of this section . . . to the extent necessary to give effect to 
any . . . convention, treaty or reciprocal law,” as well as the 
“rights to which any owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by 
this chapter.”  In short, whatever protections Article 6bis and 
Article 16(2) [of the TRIPS Agreement] might contemplate for 
famous marks, section 44(b) grants foreign mark holders 
covered by these treaties only those protections of United States 
law already specified in the Lanham Act.  The Lanham Act’s 
unfair competition protections, as we have already explained, 
are cabined by the long-established principle of territoriality.126 
 
120 See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2007). 
121 See id. at 154. 
122 Id. at 160. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 160–61.  
125 Id. at 161 (quoting Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Market, Inc., 381 
F. Supp. 2d 324, 326, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). 
126 Id. at 163 (citations omitted). 
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The court observed that Congress has amended the Lanham Act 
numerous times since the original enactment in 1946, and the 
court ruled that without further revision, it would not recognize 
the well-known marks doctrine under federal law.127 
 
127 Id. at 164. In its opinion, the court also certified to the New York Court of 
Appeals two questions regarding the status of protection of well-known foreign 
marks under New York state law. See supra note 13. 
 Since the Second Circuit issued its 2007 ITC decision, the TTAB has ceased to 
recognize what it previously termed the “famous mark doctrine,” which “entitled [a 
foreign party] to priority if it can show that its mark was, at the time of the adoption 
and first use of a similar mark by the first user in the United States, a ‘famous’ 
mark among relevant purchasers in the United States.” Compare London Reg’l 
Transp. v. William A. Berdan & Edward C. Goetz, III P’ship, 2006 WL 2032540, at 
*10 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (recognizing the doctrine using the quoted language and relying 
on a variety of earlier cases, including Mother’s Restaurants and Grupo Gigante), 
with Bayer Consumer Care AG v. Belmora LLC, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1591 
(T.T.A.B. 2009) (refusing to follow Grupo Gigante or to recognize a well-known 
foreign mark claim by way of sections 44(b) and 44(h), or to recognize a claim 
directly based on article 6bis of the Paris Convention, and instead following the ITC 
decision and its reasoning) and Fiat Group Auto. S.p.A. v. ISM, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1111, 1113 (T.T.A.B. 2010) (stating that the “ ‘well known mark’ doctrine is a 
minority view which provides no independent federal cause of action and no 
additional substantive rights beyond those found in the Lanham Act,” and relying 
largely on ITC to support its view that the Lanham Act does not recognize the 
doctrine).  
 Despite its refusal to continue to recognize a well-known foreign mark or famous 
mark exception in support of a claim for cancellation, the TTAB in Bayer Consumer 
Care AG, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, denied a registrant’s motion to dismiss the 
cancellation claim based on the grounds in section 14(3) that the registrant was 
using a mark to “misrepresent the source” of goods. Id. at 1592 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The cancellation petitioner, whose use appeared to be solely in 
foreign commerce, provided a photographic comparison of the parties’ packaging, 
and the Board appears to have found the packaging to be sufficiently similar to 
support a claim of misrepresentation and to survive the motion to dismiss. Id.  
 In addition, in Petróleos Mexicanos v. Intermix S.A., 2010 WL 5574284 (T.T.A.B. 
2010), the TTAB denied registrant Intermix’s motion to dismiss a cancellation action 
where it was based, in part, on a claim that the registration of PEMEX created a 
false suggestion of a connection with a person or institution, namely petitioner 
Petróleos Mexicanos itself, in violation of section 2(a) of the Lanham Act. The TTAB 
ruled that because the false suggestion was alleged to arise as a result of consumer 
familiarity with petitioner’s Mexican and U.S. business activities in connection with 
the PEMEX mark, the allegations were sufficient to create standing, even though 
petitioner did not allege that it had used the PEMEX mark in commerce in a way 
that would create trademark rights in the U.S. Id. at *5. The only specific U.S. 
business activity cited by the petitioner was the selling of PEMEX securities in the 
U.S. Although petitioner’s assertions that its “PEMEX name, mark, and identity 
[were] famous and renowned” and its repeated references to widespread use in 
Mexico, leading to knowledge by U.S. consumers, id. at *2–3, would make this case 
ripe for analysis in the manner I suggest for a well-known foreign mark, the 
petitioner did not clearly attempt to rest its case on PEMEX’s status as a well-
known foreign mark under the Paris Convention, Grupo Gigante, or otherwise. 
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C. Critique of the Case Law 
Most of these recent decisions indicate a fundamental 
misunderstanding about both the meaning and the significance 
of the “territoriality principle.”  The Ninth Circuit decision 
recognizing the well-known marks doctrine in spite of the court’s 
expressed territoriality concerns is an exception to some extent 
but even it overstates the need for an “exception” to territoriality 
rather than an integration of domestic and international 
principles.128  Moreover, the courts appear to underestimate the 
content and force of our international treaty obligations as well 
as the scope of sections 43(a) and 44 of the Lanham Act.  Several 
decisions fail to account for the common law’s role in providing 
substance to federal trademark law.129  The Lanham Act affirms 
and relies upon common law principles of trademark 
protection;130 except when expressly stated, it does not supersede 
those underlying principles.  The result has been a 
misunderstanding of the interaction of common law trademark 
principles and international obligations with the Lanham Act’s 
broader protections against certain forms of unfair competition. 
IV. LANHAM ACT IMPLEMENTATION OF WELL-KNOWN MARK 
PROTECTION 
This Part explains why and how the owner of a well-known 
foreign mark may bring a cause of action for trademark 
infringement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.  Most of 
section 43(a), like the rest of the U.S. law of unfair competition, 
focuses on trademark protection in order to meet two underlying 
goals: (1) supporting a trademark owner’s investment in a mark 
 
128 See Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 
2004) (stating that the Paris Convention’s principle of independence of registrations 
from country to country “arguably requires . . . [preservation of] the territoriality 
principle in some form”). But at least the Ninth Circuit separately considered 
international and domestic territoriality issues. Id. at 1097. 
129 See, e.g., supra quotation in text accompanying note 116. The Second Circuit 
repeated the quoted language from the Almacenes Exito case in its first ITC decision. 
ITC, 482 F.3d at 161. 
130 See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Common Law and Trade Marks in 
an Age of Statutes, in THE COMMON LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF PROFESSOR DAVID VAVER 331 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2010), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1502282 (explaining and commenting on the dependence 
of the Lanham Act on continued judicial development of trademark principles in a 
common law fashion, and arguing that this continued development was intended by 
Congress and has been accepted by the Supreme Court in its decisions). 
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and reputation by giving a right of action to stop confusingly 
similar uses; and (2) avoiding consumer confusion in order to 
protect consumers.131  But neither goal requires direct 
competition between two parties to an unfair competition 
dispute.132  And neither goal requires a trademark-based unfair 
competition claim to rely on a senior use of a trademark in the 
same locality as the allegedly infringing junior use. 
Part IV.A below explains the interaction between sections 
43(a), 44(b), and 44(h), three of the Lanham Act subsections that 
implement the international trademark obligations of the United 
States.  Part IV.B expands further on this issue through the lens 
of the constitutional, statutory, and prudential standing 
doctrines.  Part IV.C demonstrates how the policy underlying 
domestic trademark law supports applying section 43(a) to well-
known foreign marks.  The recognition of rights in certain well-
known foreign marks under U.S. law finds support in the 
traditionally territorial theory of both domestic law and 
international trademark rights and agreements.  This support 
exists, notwithstanding that “territoriality of rights” is the 
doctrine most strenuously raised as an impediment to the 
application of the well-known marks doctrine.  And finally, Part 
IV.D discusses some of the costs of protecting well-known foreign 
marks and suggest how those costs can be minimized. 
A. Implementation via Sections 43(a), 44(b), and 44(h) 
It is well settled that a domestic senior user of a mark may 
obtain protection under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act for 
infringement of an unregistered mark if a junior user creates a 
likelihood of confusion.133  That protection exists even if the 
confusion is likely to arise in a geographic area where the senior 
 
131 See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844–48, 1860–66 (2007) (surveying both older case 
law and more recent scholarship and finding support for the argument that both 
goals motivate the rules within and application of trademark law, although 
concluding that the producer interests outweighed the consumer interest in most 
historical cases). A third goal of trademark law, to promote free competition, is also 
cited to support certain features of trademark law, such as the prohibition on 
providing trademark rights in generic terms or descriptive terms that have not 
gained secondary meaning. See id. at 1845. 
132 See id. at 1899–904. 
133 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000); see 
also 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 27:14 (including citations from all regional federal 
circuits). 
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user has not yet used the mark, as long as the senior user has 
earned a reputation among the relevant consuming public in that 
area.134  A likelihood of confusion between a junior use of a mark 
and a senior use leads to unfair competition actionable under 
section 43(a), even without direct competition between those 
users.135 
The text of section 43(a) does not differentiate between 
domestic and foreign marks.  Read both for plain meaning and in 
light of its theoretical basis and congressional purpose, it 
provides protection for well-known foreign marks in much the 
same way that it provides protection to unregistered domestic 
marks.  Section 43(a) provides, in relevant part: 
(a) Civil action 
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or 
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any 
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or 
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading 
representation of fact, which— 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of 
such person with another person, or as to the origin, 
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person, . . . 
. . . . 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who 
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by 
such act.136 
Nowhere in the statutory language is a requirement that a 
claim of likelihood of confusion must arise from a prior domestic 
use of a trademark.137  In other words, section 43(a) does not 
require a senior trademark use within the United States.138  It 
 
134 See infra Part IV.C.1. 
135 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
136 Id. 
137 See DeBeers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate Inc., 440 F. 
Supp. 2d 249, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Anne Gilson LaLonde, Don’t I Know You 
from Somewhere? Protection in the United States of Foreign Trademarks that Are 
Well Known But Not Used There, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1379, 1398 (2008). 
138 But see DeBeers, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 269 (“Although the language of Section 
43(a) imposes a requirement of ‘use[ ] in commerce’ only on the party who is alleged 
to have infringed an unregistered mark, courts impose the same requirement on 
plaintiffs who claim such infringement.” (quoting DeBeers LV Trademark Ltd. v. 
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only requires that the complaining party prove that a “use[ ] in 
commerce [of] any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any 
combination thereof” is “likely to cause confusion” within the 
United States “as to the affiliation, connection, or association of 
[the complained-of party] with [the complaining party], or as to 
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of [complained-of party’s] 
goods, services, or commercial activities by [complaining 
party].”139  
The focus of the statute is not on the nature of the 
complaining party’s use of any word, name, or other device.  The 
focus is instead on whether the complained-of use creates or is 
likely to create a confusing effect within the United States—and 
whether that confusing effect relates to a relationship between 
the goods, services, or commercial activities of two unrelated 
parties.  The party with the right to complain of the confusing 
effect is not the confused party, but is instead the party whose 
commercial reputational interest, including but not limited to a 
competitive, economic interest, is being or will be harmed by the 
confusion.140  Section 43(a) as a general matter does not require 
trademark use in the same way that the rules governing 
registration of marks require use; section 43(a) is broad enough 
to encompass a wider range of unfair competition than mere 
trademark infringement or false advertising.141  The statutory 
 
DeBeers Diamond Syndicate Inc., No. 04 Civ. 4099(DLC), 2005 WL 1164073, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2005)); LaLonde, supra note 137, at 1379–80 (arguing that a 
trademark can be enforced in the United states when it has never been used there 
“only in certain jurisdictions and under narrowly defined circumstances”). 
 It bears notice that in the cancellation context under Lanham Act section 14, the 
TTAB also does not require domestic use in commerce of a mark—or trademark 
ownership—by the complaining party, in order for that party to possess standing to 
pursue an action. See supra note 127. 
139 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); see Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 284–85 
(1952). 
140 See infra text accompanying notes 154–76 (discussing the question of 
standing under section 43(a)). 
141 By way of example, one can consider the widely accepted cause of action for 
false endorsement under section 43(a). The nature of the false endorsement claim, as 
it currently exists under section 43(a), demonstrates the lack of a senior trademark 
use requirement within section 43(a). See Waits v. Frito Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 
1107–10 (9th Cir. 1992). False endorsement actions protect a person’s or entity’s 
right to prohibit a third party from falsely implying to consumers that the person or 
entity has endorsed the third party or its goods or services, whether the false 
endorsement is communicated through words, images, sounds, or other means. See 
id. at 1110. A false endorsement claim may be raised under section 43(a) even when 
the complaining party has never commercialized his, her, or its name or image 
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language includes a range of activities that may result in a 
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception as to affiliation, 
connection, association, origin, sponsorship, or approval.  
Continuing a basic, unadorned interpretation of section 
43(a)’s statutory language demonstrates how owners of well-
known foreign marks are included within the scope of 
appropriate complaining parties.  The statute refers only to “any 
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be 
damaged.”142  Courts have understandably restricted “any person 
who believes” to include only those persons who reasonably 
believe they are likely to be damaged, meaning those with a 
“reasonable interest to be protected” by the statute.143  This 
restriction includes owners of well-known foreign marks when 
those marks have earned a reputation for the owner within a 
U.S. market, even when that reputation has been gained by 
means other than local use.  The statute and court decisions 
require only that the reasonable belief of harm arise from the 
“use[ ] in commerce [of a] word, term, name, symbol, or 
device . . . which is likely to cause confusion . . . as to [an] 
affiliation, connection, or association,”144 which confusion could  
 
 
certainly arise between an owner of the well-known foreign mark 
and a domestic user of that mark.  No part of the text of section 
43(a) excludes such an owner. 
 
through a trademark or trademark-like use of that name or image. See id. at 1109; 
cf. Kournikova v. Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 
2003). A plaintiff is not required to actually use its own name or image in U.S. 
commerce in order to bring a valid section 43(a) claim. See, e.g., Trump Plaza of the 
Palm Beaches Condo. Ass’n v. Rosenthal, No. 08-80408-CIV, 2009 WL 1812743, at 
*11 (S.D. Fla. June 24, 2009) (dismissing plaintiff’s trademark dilution and 
cybersquatting claims for lack of standing because plaintiff was not the owner of the 
TRUMP PLAZA mark, but refusing to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for false 
association or affiliation based on defendant’s use of that mark). 
142 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
143 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1108 (quoting Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 608 (9th 
Cir. 1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Dovenmuehle v. Gilldorn Mortg. 
Midwest Corp., 871 F.2d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Johnson & Johnson v. 
Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 1980)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Johnson & Johnson, 631 F.2d at 190 (quoting 1 RUDOLF CALLMAN, UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, TRADEMARK AND MONOPOLIES § 18.2(b), at 625 (3d ed. 1967)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
144 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
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Sections 44(b) and 44(h) were included in the Lanham Act to 
ensure that foreign trademark owners are allowed to obtain 
redress under section 43(a) and the rest of the Lanham Act under 
the same conditions as U.S. owners.145  Compared to other 
provisions of the Lanham Act, these portions of section 44 are 
relatively spare of specific substantive rights.146  But in light of 
the design of the section, that approach is entirely logical.  
Congress wished for foreign nationals to obtain the same rights 
and remedies as U.S. nationals, and it intended to fully 
implement, or exceed, all minimum rights required by the 
international obligations of the United States.147  By providing 
 
145 See S. REP. NO. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1274, 
1276 (indicating that Congress intended the Lanham Act “[t]o carry out by statute 
our international commitments to the end that American traders in foreign 
countries may secure the protection to their marks to which they are entitled” 
because “[i]ndustrialists in this country have been seriously handicapped in securing 
protection in foreign countries due to our failure to carry out, by statute, our 
international obligations”). 
146 See 15 U.S.C. § 1126. Section 1126 states, in part: 
(b) Benefits of section to persons whose country of origin is party to 
convention or treaty.  
Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention or treaty 
relating to trademarks, trade or commercial names, or the repression of 
unfair competition, to which the United States is also a party, or extends 
reciprocal rights to nationals of the United States by law, shall be entitled 
to the benefits of this section under the conditions expressed herein to the 
extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or 
reciprocal law, in addition to the rights to which any owner of a mark is 
otherwise entitled by this chapter. 
. . . . 
(h) Protection of foreign nationals against unfair competition.  
Any person designated in subsection (b) of this section as entitled to the 
benefits and subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be entitled to 
effective protection against unfair competition, and the remedies provided 
in this chapter for infringement of marks shall be available so far as they 
may be appropriate in repressing acts of unfair competition. 
Id.; see also infra notes 148, 151. 
147 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127. The section states: 
The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of 
Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks 
in such commerce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce from 
interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged 
in such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and 
deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, 
counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks; and to provide 
rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting 
trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the 
United States and foreign nations. 
Id. 
CP_Lockridge (Do Not Delete) 4/4/2011  2:14 PM 
1384 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1347   
that foreign nationals may utilize Lanham Act provisions on the 
same terms as domestic nationals, rather than crafting all new 
provisions applicable only to foreign nationals, Congress ensured 
that consistent treatment would be provided to both groups 
regardless of changes in the underlying domestic statutes or the 
judicial decisions applying them.148  The rights available to 
foreign nationals “piggyback,” in a sense, off of the text, the case 
law, and the theory of the remainder of federal trademark law.149  
The breadth of section 43(a) and the specific language of sections 
44(b) and 44(h)150—which together provide foreign owners access  
 
to section 43(a)’s breadth151—shows that the Lanham Act itself 
 
148 Following the express connections created by section 44, we can see that 
foreign nationals have equivalent standing to domestic owners. Section 44(b) gives 
select foreign nationals the benefits of the remainder of section 44. See id. § 1126(b). 
Section 44(b)–(f) collectively provides access to the U.S. trademark registration 
system. See id. § 1126(b)–(f). The use of section 32 to obtain protection against 
infringement of a registered trademark depends on the ability of a foreign national 
to become the owner of a registered mark by way of section 44(b)–(f) and section 1.  
 Section 44(h) provides foreign nationals with rights against unfair competition 
that go beyond ownership of registered rights. Within the scope of section 44(h)’s 
unfair competition protection is the ability to raise claims for unfair competition 
under section 43(a), as well as those actions provided in section 43(b)–(d) for import 
control, trademark dilution, and cybersquatting. See id. § 1126(h). The protection 
against unfair competition provided by section 43(a) includes the ability to bring a 
cause of action for false advertising, false endorsement, or false affiliation or 
association. See id. § 1125(a). 
149 Only section 44(c)–(e) creates separate mechanisms for use by foreign 
nationals—providing, for example, that foreign nationals who have obtained a 
registration for a mark in their country of origin may register that mark in the 
United States without providing that the mark is in use in commerce. See 
id. § 1126(c)–(e).  
150 See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:4 (arguing that protection for well-
known foreign marks is incorporated into U.S. law through sections 43(a), 44(b), and 
44(h) because 44(b) provides access to protection, 44(h) provides substantive rights 
coextensive with the protection owed to foreign nationals under relevant trademark 
treaties, and 43(a) gives the foreign nation without a registration standing to sue); 
see also Andrew Cook, Article, Do as We Say, Not as We Do: A Study of the Well-
Known Marks Doctrine in the United States, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 
412, 422–24, 426–28 (2009) (arguing, following the reasoning of the McCarthy 
treatise, that protection is currently available under a theory that knowledge of a 
well-known mark provides it constructive priority in the area of knowledge, yet 
advocating that the resolution to the circuit split is to explicitly incorporate 
protection into the Lanham Act). 
151 Unsettled is the question of whether section 44(h) goes beyond its role of 
combining with section 44(b) to give foreign nationals a clear statutory cause of 
action under the various subsections of section 43 in the manner described above. 
Courts are split on whether section 44(h) also provides to foreign nationals a federal 
cause of action for unfair competition that is separate from, and goes beyond the 
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provides an appropriate and theoretically consistent statutory 
cause of action for the owners of well-known foreign marks.152 
Courts should not rely on vague, possibly inaccurate, notions 
of what aspects of the common law of trademarks were 
 
terms of, section 43. See, e.g., Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 792 
(9th Cir. 1981) (holding that section 44(h) gives foreign nationals referred to by 
section 44(b) a federal claim coextensive with the substantive provisions of the 
relevant trademark treaty, which in that case was a bilateral agreement with 
Japan); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp. 684, 687 (E.D. 
Mich. 1996) (agreeing that the Lanham Act incorporates the substantive provisions 
of the Paris Convention, including article 10bis, by way of sections 44(b) and 44(h)); 
Maison Lazard et Compagnie v. Manfra, Tordella & Brooks, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1286, 
1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that a federal cause of action exists for unfair 
competition under the Paris Convention, section 44(b), and section 44(h)); Vanity 
Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 644 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding that the 
Lanham Act incorporates only limited protections against unfair competition, not a 
broad right as might be available if the Paris Convention were self-executing); see 
also J. Thomas McCarthy, Lanham Act § 43(a): The Sleeping Giant Is Now Wide 
Awake, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 48–50 (1996) (noting that the precise range 
of protection provided by  section 44 is unclear). In this article I do not address this 
open issue, nor do I rely on any arguments related to the self-executing, or non-self-
executing nature or effect of any portion of the Paris Convention under U.S. law. 
152 The Second Circuit’s decision in Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 
F.2d 633, has been cited to justify decisions both: (1) asserting that section 44 only 
incorporates national treatment from the Paris Convention; and (2) therefore 
denying that section 44 of the Lanham Act incorporates any substantive aspects of 
the Paris Convention. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 908 (9th 
Cir. 2002); Int’l Café, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Café Int’l (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 
1278 (11th Cir. 2001). Some of these decisions in fact state—mistakenly—that the 
Paris Convention itself contains no substantive provisions. See e.g., Mattel, Inc., 296 
F.3d at 908; Int’l Café, S.A.L., 252 F.3d at 1278. But the facts of Vanity Fair do not 
bear out such a broad interpretation. In the Vanity Fair case, the plaintiff was 
asking the court to apply the substance of the Lanham Act to the defendant’s use of 
a trademark that took place wholly, or almost wholly, in Canada. Vanity Fair Mills, 
Inc., 234 F.2d at 639, 641. The plaintiff argued for this protection by pointing to 
section 44’s mandate of “effective protection against unfair competition,” which 
echoes the Paris Convention. See id. at 640, 643 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Article 10bis of the Paris Convention requires member nations to provide “effective 
protection against unfair competition.” Paris Convention, supra note 6, art. 10bis. 
 With that in mind, the Second Circuit’s ruling that section 44 did not give the 
plaintiff a right of action to restrain unfair competition taking place in a foreign 
nation is rather limited. It rejects the idea that section 44 applies extraterritorially, 
but it does not preclude a finding that section 44 provides foreign trademark owners 
with access to other protection against unfair competition that is required by the 
Paris Convention and provided in another way within the Lanham Act. Most 
specifically, the Vanity Fair decision, when viewed in light of the facts before the 
court, in no way indicates that a foreign trademark owner cannot look to section 44 
and section 43(a) to provide a right of action against a defendant’s conduct that 
takes place wholly within the United States. See Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at 905–
06, 941–42 (describing the Vanity Fair case and providing analysis of the Vanity 
Fair decision similar to that set forth here). 
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incorporated by Congress into the Lanham Act.153  Instead, courts 
should more carefully address the specific language of the 
Lanham Act including which parties can and should be granted 
standing to raise a claim.  
B. Standing Under Section 43(a)  
Courts do not often frame the issue of justiciable trademark 
rights under section 43(a) as a matter of standing, although they 
should do so more often.154  The analytical framework of standing 
and cases analyzing standing to raise a federal unfair 
competition claim under section 43(a) are helpful, however, in 
explaining why well-known foreign marks are likewise entitled to 
protection under section 43(a).  Considering standing helps focus 
attention on the statutory language and the zone of interests 
protected by that language so that a decision maker may not as 
easily be distracted by the red herring of “territoriality.” 
 
153 See, e.g., Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 
324, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (asserting that common law trademark doctrines “may 
support state causes of action, but [have] no place in federal law where Congress has 
enacted a statute, the Lanham Act, that carefully prescribes the bases for federal 
trademark claims” (citation omitted)). I argue that this assertion entirely 
misapprehends the interaction between the common law of trademarks and the 
Lanham Act, which relies for a significant amount of its effect on the common law, 
including the analysis of when a likelihood of confusion may arise and when an 
unregistered trademark is enforceable. See Dinwoodie, supra note 43, at 602–03. 
Moreover, this statement, and others like it, ignore the fact that section 43(a) 
provides statutory authority for judicial enforcement of a broad range of unfair 
competition claims, including infringement of unregistered marks, false 
endorsement, false advertising, and other related actions. 
154 Some courts have used standing in well-known foreign marks cases, but they 
do not often do so for the trademark portion of the foreign owner’s claims. See, e.g., 
De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate Inc., No. 04 Civ. 
4099(DLC), 2005 WL 1164073, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2005) (applying standing 
principles to deny a defendant’s affirmative defense of lack of standing at an early 
stage of the proceedings, thus allowing the plaintiff’s trademark claims to go 
forward); ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 275, 291–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(applying standing principles to deny the plaintiff’s false advertising claim but not 
its trademark claim), aff’d, 518 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2008). But see Kerzner Int’l Ltd. v. 
Monarch Casino & Resort, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1044 (D. Nev. 2009) (denying 
a motion to dismiss a claim for lack of standing because the plaintiff had not used its 
mark in connection with services offered inside the United States by noting that if 
the mark had well-known status under Grupo Gigante, the plaintiff would in fact 
have standing). Courts regularly examine standing in false advertising cases under 
section 43(a). See, e.g., Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 
F.3d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1998). As I observe in note 127, supra, the TTAB does 
regularly address standing in its review of cancellation proceedings, which are 
brought under section 14 rather than section 43(a). 
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The question should be whether a foreign trademark owner, 
who has not otherwise created trademark rights in the United 
States through registration or use, has standing to sue under 
section 43(a) to enjoin a junior use in the United States that is 
likely to cause consumer confusion as a result of the foreign 
mark’s previously earned well-known status in the relevant 
market.  
As further set forth in Part IV.A above, section 43(a)(1) of the 
Lanham Act provides a civil cause of action to “any person who 
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged” by another 
person’s use in commerce of any mark that is “likely to cause 
confusion . . . as to the affiliation, connection, or association” 
between the damaged person and the other person or “as to the 
origin, sponsorship, or approval of [the other person’s] goods, 
services, or commercial activities” by the damaged person.155  
Owners of trademarks that have become well known in the 
United States through reputation rather than through expansion 
from foreign to domestic use have standing to bring an action 
under this provision.  Standing has three components under U.S. 
law: constitutional, prudential, and statutory.156  Owners of well-
known foreign marks with a reputation within the relevant U.S. 
market satisfy all of these. 
The constitutional standing requirements embody the “case 
or controversy” limitation on the federal courts’ authority, 
derived from Article III of the Constitution.157  The “case or 
controversy” limitation requires that “a plaintiff must, generally 
speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered ‘injury in fact,’ that 
the injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to the actions of the defendant, and 
that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.”158  
In any case under section 43(a), the “injury in fact” is a likelihood 
of confusion even if actual confusion is not proven.159  Traceability 
in trademark law is typically uncontroversial because the specific 
language of the statute, as well as common law requirements, 
demand proof that it is the defendant’s use of a word or other 
 
155 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006). 
156 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162–65 (1997); see also Conte Bros., 165 
F.3d at 225 (applying constitutional, prudential, and statutory standing 
considerations in a section 43(a) false advertising action). 
157 Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162. 
158 Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 
159 See Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
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device that is causing the likelihood of confusion.160  In 
trademark law, a successful plaintiff usually obtains an 
injunction against the defendant’s infringing use, which 
ameliorates the injury of likely confusion.161 
Beyond the constitutional limitation on standing, the 
“judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction”162 embodied in prudential standing principles also 
limit the ability of some plaintiffs to petition a federal court for 
redress.  The prudential standing principles seek to ensure that 
the judicial power is properly invoked in light of the 
“limited[ ]role of the courts in a democratic society,”163 in order 
“to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no 
individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the 
federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular 
claim.”164  While courts do not apply a specific formula or analysis 
of particular factors in examining the question of prudential 
standing, there are common considerations: (1) a litigant must 
“assert his [or her] own legal interests rather than those of third 
parties”;165 (2) courts should “refrain from adjudicating ‘abstract 
questions of wide public significance’ which amount to 
‘generalized grievances’ ”;166 and (3) a litigant’s “grievance must 
arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated 
by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee 
invoked.”167  Courts utilize the prudential standing doctrine 
unless Congress expressly abrogates it by statute.168  In the case 
 
160 Id.; see also Conte Bros., 165 F.3d at 225 (holding that plaintiff’s complaint 
alleging lost sale of motor oil products due to the defendant’s false advertising 
satisfied the first two requirements of Article III standing for a Lanham Act claim).  
161 See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson, 631 F.2d at 191. Monetary remedies are 
sometimes awarded in successful trademark infringement lawsuits. 
162 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. 
v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75 (1982)). 
163 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (citing Schelsinger v. Reservists to 
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221–27 (1974)). 
164 Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1979). 
165 Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.3d 534, 538 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
166 Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Syracuse Hous. Auth., 962 F.2d 1101, 1106 (2d Cir. 
1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
167 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737, 751 (1984)). 
168 Id. at 163 (“Congress legislates against the background of our prudential 
standing doctrine, which applies unless it is expressly negated.” (citing Block v. 
Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345–48 (1984)). 
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of owners of well-known foreign marks, the owners assert their 
own interests in concrete disputes.  As a result, the only 
prudential standing limitation that might arise in this situation 
would arise from the “zone of interests” analysis. 
By providing express statutory standing requirements, 
Congress can narrow or expand the group of persons who might 
otherwise have standing under the prudential standing 
doctrine.169  When Congress provides standing requirements, the 
analysis of those requirements supersedes the more general 
“zone of interests” inquiry, although the two can merge.170  In 
section 43(a)(1), Congress provided express statutory standing to 
“any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be 
damaged” by the use in commerce of  
any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof . . . which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or 
association of such person with another person, or as to the 
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person.171 
Although in other circumstances, particularly with 
environmental statutes’ citizen suit provisions, the Supreme 
Court has taken “the term ‘any person’ at face value,”172 courts 
need not go so far in section 43(a) in order to include the owners 
of foreign well-known marks within the group of potentially 
appropriate plaintiffs.173 
 
169 See id. 
170 See id. 
171 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006). 
172 Bennett, 520 U.S. at 165. 
173 Courts presented with the question have almost universally held that a 
consumer does not have standing to sue under section 43(a), even though he or she 
might be “any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged” by the 
confusion engendered by the use of similar marks on similar goods or services. See, 
e.g., Serbin v. Ziebart Int’l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1166–76 (3d Cir. 1993) (surveying 
cases); Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(“Congress’ purpose in enacting § 43(a) was to create a special and limited unfair 
competition remedy, virtually without regard for the interests of consumers 
generally and almost certainly without consideration of consumer rights of action in 
particular.” (citations omitted)); Loy v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 838 F. Supp. 
991, 996–97 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (“Since the intent of the Lanham Act is to protect 
persons engaged in commerce against unfair competition, the court adopts the view 
that a consumer must have a reasonable commercial interest in order to pursue a 
Section 43(a) claim.” (citation omitted)). Courts have excluded consumers from the 
group of plaintiffs with standing by applying a rule requiring a commercial, or 
sometimes even competitive, injury. See Serbin, 11 F.3d at 1175 (“[T]he statute 
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Owners of well-known foreign marks easily fit within the 
zone of commercial and competitive interests protected by the 
Lanham Act, even when the mark is not currently in domestic 
use.  Congress even specifically included foreign nationals with 
relevant treaty connections within the Lanham Act’s zone of 
interests: 
(b) Benefits of section to persons whose country of origin is 
party to convention or treaty. 
Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention 
or treaty relating to trademarks, trade or commercial names, or 
the repression of unfair competition, to which the United States 
is also a party, or extends reciprocal rights to nationals of the 
United States by law, shall be entitled to the benefits of this 
section under the conditions expressed herein to the extent 
necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention, 
treaty or reciprocal law, in addition to the rights to which any 
owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by this chapter.174 
When a junior user endangers the commercial or competitive 
interests of the owner of a well-known foreign mark, the owner 
must be protected under section 43(a), whether the owner is a 
U.S. national or a foreign national.  A junior user’s use of the 
mark endangers these interests in areas in the United States 
where the senior foreign mark is well known, threatening the 
goodwill in that mark as well as the broader reputation, 
products, services, and commercial activities of the senior owner.  
The domestic confusion that might arise could damage the senior 
owner’s ability to expand into the United States using the well-
known mark or could so seriously affect the reputation of the 
senior owner that the owner would have difficulty operating 
successfully in the United States using any other mark. 
Owners of well-known foreign marks are soundly included 
within those parties having standing to sue under section 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act.175  Neither the Constitution, nor the statutory 
 
provides a private remedy to a commercial plaintiff who meets the burden of proving 
that its commercial interests have been harmed by a competitor’s false 
advertising.”). The commercial injury requirement applies to owners of well-known 
foreign marks as well.  
174 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b). 
175 Cf. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:4 (arguing for standing under section 
43(a) for owners of well-known foreign marks by reference to section 44(h) and its 
incorporation of treaty obligations rather than specifically by reference to the zone of 
interests protected by section 43(a)); id. § 29:61 (referring only to sections 44(b) and 
44(h)); Brandon Barker, The Power of the Well-Known Trademark: Courts Should 
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text, nor any expressed intent of Congress would exclude them, 
nor would any prudential consideration contemplated by the 
judicial doctrines of standing.  Objections to the recognition of 
rights in well-known foreign marks often arise from an argument 
that such recognition would threaten or violate the “territoriality 
principle” underlying U.S. trademark law.176  The next Part of 
this Article explains why those objections are unfounded. 
C. Territoriality in Trademark Law 
As demonstrated in Part III, the “territorial” nature of 
trademark law has been cited by courts to justify denying 
domestic rights to a well-known foreign mark that has not been 
used in the United States.177  The roots of trademark’s 
territoriality principle, as well as its content, thus deserve 
examination.  Universality of rights, rather than strict 
territoriality of rights, held sway within trademark law until the 
 
Consider Article 6bis of the Paris Convention an Integrated Part of Section 44 of the 
Lanham Act, 81 WASH. L. REV. 363, 373–77 (2006) (arguing that sections 44(b), 
44(h), and 44(i), read together, incorporate Paris Convention protection for well-
known foreign marks without referring to section 43(a)); Jeffrey M. Reichard & Sam 
Sneed, The Famous Marks Doctrine: A Call for American Courts To Grant 
Trademark Rights to Famous Foreign Marks, 9 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 85, 
92 (2009) (arguing that “the plain language of Lanham Act Sections 44(b), 44(h), and 
44(i) indicates that Article 6bis should be incorporated into United States trademark 
law”). But see Tashia A. Bunch, Well-Known Marks Doctrine: Where Do We Go from 
Here?, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 227, 237 (2008) (concluding that 
protection for well-known foreign marks “has no basis in [current] federal trademark 
law and courts should not apply the doctrine until Congress adds it to the [Lanham] 
Act”); LaLonde, supra note 137, at 1395–96 (“[T]he well-known marks protection in 
the TRIPS Agreement has not been implemented in the Lanham Act. . . . Locating in 
the Lanham Act a well-known marks exception to the U.S. use requirement takes a 
combination of fancy footwork and wishful thinking.”); Alexis Weissberger, Note, Is 
Fame Alone Sufficient To Create Priority Rights: An International Perspective on the 
Viability of the Famous/Well-Known Marks Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
739, 767–68, 770, 778 (2006) (arguing that well-known foreign marks are not 
protected by federal law and recommending amendment of the Lanham Act). 
176 See LaLonde, supra note 137, at 1399 (“Allowing relief under current 
Lanham Act language without use of a mark in the United States would be a huge 
departure from settled law.”); Weissberger, supra note 175, at 743 (“While 
[protection for well-known foreign marks] may be cognizable under state law, it 
should not be incorporated into federal law where the Lanham Act and the 
territoriality principle are controlling.”). 
177 See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 161 (2d Cir. 2007); 
Almacenes Exito S.A. v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 324, 326–28 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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1930s.178  With a long view of the development of the law in mind, 
it is historically unjustified to assert that territoriality is such a 
“bedrock” principle of trademark law that it cannot be 
reconsidered and contextualized in certain circumstances.179 
Territorial limitations on trademark law are, to be sure, 
supported by certain concepts and traditions within trademark 
law.  Those concepts may be either intrinsic or extrinsic to the 
theory of trademark law.180  Territorial limitations are inherent 
in common law trademark rights:  An owner’s right to prevent 
others from using a confusingly similar mark is limited to the 
area in which the owner possesses goodwill or reputation.181  And 
territorial restrictions to trademark rights that are created 
through political bodies, such as national trademark 
registrations, which rely on the authority of a nation with 
territorially limited sovereign power, are extrinsic.182 
No basis for the territoriality of trademark rights, however, 
supports the complete exclusion of well-known foreign marks 
from the protection against unfair competition provided in the 
Lanham Act.  Applying the well-known marks doctrine in a way 
that protects senior users with no domestic use but with a 
domestic reputation promotes rather than diminishes the real 
root of the intrinsically territorial nature of a trademark.  When 
trademark law recognizes and protects the trademark owner’s 
reputation and goodwill represented and implicated by a 
trademark, thereby protecting both consumer understandings 
and producer interests, it protects and recognizes a trademark’s 
 
178 See, e.g., Walter J. Derenberg, Territorial Scope and Situs of Trademarks and 
Good Will, 47 VA. L. REV. 733, 734 (1961). 
179 See Almacenes Exito, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 326. 
180 See Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at 891–908. I credit Professor Dinwoodie with 
inspiring and supporting this portion of my analysis through his logical and 
thorough exegesis of the various territorial aspects of trademark law in his article. 
181 See id. at 888. Dinwoodie states: 
For example, common law trademark rights are territorial because the 
intrinsic purpose of trademark law suggests extending (and limiting) rights 
to the geographic reach of goodwill. In contrast, registration systems 
designed to promote economic expansion derive their territorial character 
from their grounding in economic policymaking, effected by institutions 
that focus on the regulation or development of discrete economic regions. 
And rules regarding the enforcement of trademark rights assume their 
territorial quality because of their connection to political institutions with 
territorially defined sovereignty. 
Id. 
182 See id. 
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intrinsic socio-cultural aspects that have territorial limitations.  
Political bases of territoriality, including concerns for comity 
often raised to fight any divergence from the strict territoriality 
of intellectual property rights, pose no problem.  As explained 
further in Part IV.C.2 below, applying section 43(a) to effectuate 
the well-known marks doctrine in the United States only 
adjudicates the propriety of a junior user’s activity on U.S. 
territory.  Simply applying the Lanham Act to the use of a mark 
that is well known in the United States would not invoke any 
rights that may have been awarded to the mark’s owner under 
foreign law, nor would it require the extraterritorial application 
of U.S. law. 
1. Intrinsic Territoriality 
Trademark law aims to protect the reputation and goodwill 
of a mark, and thus the mark’s owner, and to protect consumers 
from deception and confusion as to the source of goods and 
services.183  Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protects both 
registered and unregistered, or common law, marks.184  It has 
been used to protect against false endorsement and false 
association or affiliation as well, even when the complaining 
party does not possess traditional trademark rights.185  It also 
provides for a remedy against false and misleading advertising 
when such advertising causes injury to competitive interests.186  
The primary difficulty courts and commentators seem to have 
with extending the protection of section 43(a) to owners of foreign 
marks that are well known in the United States is the rule, taken 
from domestic cases, that protectable trademark goodwill can 
 
183 There is some debate regarding whether U.S. trademark law protects both 
consumers and producers, or whether instead the historical focus has been on 
producer interests with consumer effects relevant only to a determination of the 
effect on the producer. See McKenna, supra note 131. Nevertheless, both interests—
or at least the effects of a junior use on both consumer understanding and producer 
investment—currently motivate and guide trademark decisions, as demonstrated by 
the factor analysis for likelihood of confusion and the rhetoric used by courts in 
deciding cases. See infra note 224. The effect on consumer understanding was also a 
factor in older decisions, and thus on trademark law as it existed at the time the 
Lanham Act was created, even if the effect was relevant to the decision only insofar 
as it indicated for a court when a competitor had invaded a producer’s protectable 
interest. See infra note 224.  
184 See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 784 (Stevens, J., 
concurring); McCarthy, supra note 151, at 53–54, 58–59. 
185 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
186 See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 151, at 53–54, 56–57. 
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only follow the geographic extent of the trade in goods bearing a 
trademark.187  
The context for the basic domestic territoriality rule was and 
continues to be priority disputes between users of similar marks 
in fully separate trading areas with no overlap of goodwill or 
consumers.  Judges should not lightly apply a rule developed for 
this situation to a completely different one involving a mark 
whose reputation crosses national boundaries.  Well-known 
foreign marks present a different set of circumstances, since in 
order to qualify as “well known,” a mark must in fact be known 
by consumers in the disputed trading area.188  As such, the caveat 
to the basic territoriality rule allowing for protection in areas of 
reputation as well as areas of use—set forth in more detail 
below—is more applicable.  This Section fully explores the 
domestic “territoriality” doctrine cited by courts in objecting to 
the protection of well-known foreign marks, and it explains why 
the domestic basis of territoriality, when fully understood, poses 
no obstacle to that protection. 
a. Territorial Limits on Trademark Rights 
In the early part of the twentieth century, the Supreme 
Court heard two cases that turned on the rules of priority 
governing trademark rights.189  The resulting rule became known 
as the Tea Rose doctrine, named after the trademark at issue in 
the first of the two cases.190  According to the Court:  “Into 
whatever markets the use of a trademark has extended, or its  
 
 
 
meaning has become known, there will the manufacturer or 
trader whose trade is pirated by an infringing use be entitled to 
protection and redress.”191 
 
187 See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 155 (2d Cir. 2007). 
188 See supra Part II.C. 
189 See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); United Drug 
Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918). 
190 See Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at 895 n.26. 
191 Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 415–16. In addition: 
[u]ndoubtedly, the general rule is that, as between conflicting claimants to 
the right to use the same mark, priority of appropriation determines the 
question. But the reason is that purchasers have come to understand the 
mark as indicating the origin of the wares, so that its use by a second 
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Under the Tea Rose doctrine, courts presume that consumer 
associations have been made, and a reputation exists, anywhere 
the mark has been used.192  The Supreme Court used this general 
statement of the limits of trademark rights to craft an exception 
to a general “first in time” rule: 
In the ordinary case of parties competing under the same mark 
in the same market, it is correct to say that prior appropriation 
settles the question.  But where two parties independently are 
employing the same mark upon goods of the same class, but in 
separate markets wholly remote the one from the other, the 
question of prior appropriation is legally insignificant; unless, at 
least, it appear that the second adopter has selected the mark 
with some design inimical to the interests of the first user, such 
as to take the benefit of the reputation of his goods, to forestall 
the extension of his trade, or the like.193 
It is worth noting that U.S. law has created a slightly 
different rule for priority of rights in inherently distinctive marks 
as compared to marks that must acquire distinctiveness for 
enforceability.194  Simple priority of use in a geographic area 
governs rights in inherently distinctive marks.195  But if a mark 
is not inherently distinctive, a measure of secondary meaning 
must be shown on the part of a senior user before that user can 
enjoin a junior use.196  The creation of some consumer 
associations is thus arguably required in the case of non-
 
producer amounts to an attempt to sell his goods as those of his competitor. 
The reason for the rule does not extend to a case where the same trade-
mark happens to be employed simultaneously by two manufacturers in 
different markets separate and remote from each other, so that the mark 
means one thing in one market, an entirely different thing in another. It 
would be a perversion of the rule of priority to give it such an application in 
our broadly extended country that an innocent party who had in good faith 
employed a trade-mark in one state, and by the use of it had built up a 
trade there, being the first appropriator in that jurisdiction, might 
afterwards be prevented from using it, with consequent injury to his trade 
and good will . . . . 
United Drug, 248 U.S. at 100 (citations omitted). 
192 Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 413–14 (“[T]he right grows out of use, not 
mere adoption. . . . In short, the trademark is treated as merely a protection for the 
good will, and not the subject of property except in connection with an existing 
business.”). 
193 Id. at 415. 
194 See supra note 93 (explaining inherent and acquired distinctiveness). 
195 See supra note 93. 
196 See generally 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 16:34 (explaining the priority 
rules that apply to secondary meaning). 
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inherently distinctive marks, but direct evidence on the specific 
geographic extent of those associations is not required.197  And in 
many cases, real evidence on the existence of any consumer 
association is not required by statute, even when a mark user 
seeks a federal registration that will then create nationwide 
priority.198  As a result of the rules governing both inherently and 
non-inherently distinctive marks and the extent of rights 
provided compared to the extent of goodwill that must be 
proven—namely, none—any honest assessment of this rule must 
admit that it is an imperfect measure.199  It is only a rule of  
 
thumb—a valuable rule of thumb that I do not advocate 
overturning at this juncture—but a rough measure 
nonetheless.200 
 
197 See, e.g., Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc’s B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 844 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (holding, in a case of a senior user catering to travelers, that secondary 
meaning among a “substantial portion of consumers nationally” would satisfy the 
requirement of showing a local reputation in the area of the junior user (citing 
Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. Mullen’s Holiday Inn, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. Cal. 
1968)). 
198 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006) (providing for registration of a descriptive 
mark that “has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce,” and giving 
the trademark office the power to “accept as prima facie evidence that the mark has 
become distinctive, as used on or in connection with the applicant’s goods in 
commerce, proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark by 
the applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which the claim of 
distinctiveness is made”). Surveys and other forms of market research and consumer 
reaction studies are relevant to the determination of acquired distinctiveness, but 
there is no rule that requires the surveys to cover consumers within a large swath of 
U.S. territory. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., TRADEMARK MANUAL OF 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1212.06(d) (2010). 
199 Although it is an imperfect measure of the extent of actual consumer 
understandings regarding a mark, it might still be an accurate measure of the 
extent to which the U.S. Congress wished to provide trademark protections. But 
since none of the above-discussed doctrines were expressly incorporated into the 
Lanham Act and have remained malleable judge-made law, one cannot make an 
ironclad assertion that Congress cemented any particular version of the domestic 
territoriality doctrines within the overall scheme of the Lanham Act. And given the 
express language of the Lanham Act, I would argue that Congress in fact did not 
cement these domestic territoriality doctrines into the Lanham Act in a way that 
would override the remainder of the statutory scheme and its incorporation of the 
protections required under our international agreements. 
200 Cf. Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 
S.C. L. REV. 695, 712–13, 717 (1998) (critiquing reliance on the geographic overlap or 
separation of trademark uses, in the context of discussing concurrent uses of marks 
on the internet, by arguing that “trademark law is distinctly based upon market 
separations, and . . . geographic separations are merely a surrogate or an 
approximation for defining the relevant market” and going on to argue that “[b]y 
CP_Lockridge (Do Not Delete) 4/4/2011  2:14 PM 
2010] INT’L OBLIGATIONS IN U.S. TRADEMARK LAW 1397 
Despite the long-standing nature of the Tea Rose doctrine 
linking goodwill to the geographic area of use, U.S. law does not 
countenance an ironclad rule that where the trade has not gone, 
no reputation can exist.201  U.S. law recognizes the possibility 
that trademark reputation can precede trademark use in some 
geographic areas.202  And when reputation does precede use, the 
senior trademark user has a protectable interest and is awarded 
rights superior to a junior user, even if the junior user was the 
first to actually use the mark in the particular geographic area.203  
In those circumstances, courts allow the senior user to enjoin the  
 
 
 
junior use, even when the senior user has not yet used the mark 
in commerce in that area and has no particular plans to begin 
use in that area.204 
An old and oft-cited example of reputation preceding actual 
use in a geographic location is the STORK CLUB case.205  A New 
York club used the STORK CLUB mark in connection with a 
 
determining the purpose of geographically based trademark rules, we can adapt 
traditional rules to serve the Internet”). 
201 Hanover Star Milling did state the rule that way in applying its rule to the 
facts of the case, but the general rule quoted above does not preclude the possibility.  
That property in a trademark is not limited in its enjoyment by territorial 
bounds, but may be asserted and protected wherever the law affords a 
remedy for wrongs, is true in a limited sense. Into whatever markets the use 
of a trademark has extended, or its meaning has become known, there will 
the manufacturer or trader whose trade is pirated by an infringing use be 
entitled to protection and redress. But this is not to say that the proprietor 
of a trademark, good in the markets where it has been employed, can 
monopolize markets that his trade has never reached, and where the mark 
signifies not his goods, but those of another. We agree with the court below 
that ‘since it is the trade, and not the mark, that is to be protected, a 
trademark acknowledges no territorial boundaries of municipalities or 
states or nations, but extends to every market where the trader’s goods have 
become known and identified by his use of the mark. But the mark, of itself, 
cannot travel to markets where there is no article to wear the badge and no 
trader to offer the article.’ 
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415–16 (1916) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted).  
202 See Fuddruckers, 826 F.2d at 844; Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. B&B Corp., 
409 F.2d 614, 617 (3d Cir. 1969); Travelodge Corp. v. Siragusa, 228 F. Supp. 238, 
243 (N.D. Ala. 1964), aff’d, 352 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1965). 
203 See generally 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26:16–19. 
204 See id.  
205 Stork Rest. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948). 
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fairly upscale establishment.206  Despite lack of actual use outside 
New York City, the club obtained an injunction against a 
relatively lowbrow San Francisco club that attempted to use the 
same mark.207  The court based its decision on the fact that San 
Francisco residents would likely know of the New York 
establishment due to its widespread reputation.208  That 
reputation in San Francisco predated the junior use in San 
Francisco, meaning that the junior San Francisco use could cause 
confusion.209  So the New York establishment prevailed, even 
though the San Francisco user was the first to make actual use of 
the mark in San Francisco. 
In the absence of direct proof of the extent of goodwill or 
reputation, a rule that goodwill, and thus an owner’s protectable 
interest, cannot extend beyond the geographic range of use does 
operate efficiently.  But in this age of easier, more affordable 
national and international travel and almost-zero-marginal-cost 
global communications networks, knowledge of a mark and its 
associated goods and services can easily travel beyond the 
geographic reach of actual use.210  U.S. domestic law certainly 
recognizes this phenomenon, although most cases present facts 
spanning only domestic territory rather than crossing an 
international border.211 
In creating the Tea Rose rule, the Supreme Court itself 
recognized the possibility that a mark might be known in a 
geographic area without actual use in that area when it stated:  
“Into whatever markets the use of a trademark has extended, or 
its meaning has become known, there will the manufacturer or 
trader whose trade is pirated by an infringing use be entitled to 
protection and redress.”212  Many courts have ignored the 
emphasized language.213  Nevertheless, numerous cases have 
 
206 Id. at 350. 
207 Id. at 351, 364. 
208 Id. at 351, 358–59. 
209 Id. at 355. 
210 Accord MOSTERT, supra note 44, at 1–6. 
211 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 202. 
212 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415–16 (1916) (emphasis 
added). 
213 See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2007). But see 
Peaches Entm’t Corp. v. Entm’t Repertoire Assocs., 62 F.3d 690, 693–95 (5th Cir. 
1995) (noting the language emphasized above from Hanover Star Milling and using 
it to support its holding that the trade area for an unregistered mark extends to the 
“zone of reputation”). 
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recognized the principle that reputation can precede use.  In 
those situations, the courts have barred the junior user from 
establishing superior rights in a separate geographic area, even 
when that junior user did not himself know of the senior mark.214  
The remote, good-faith junior user defense only succeeds in 
domestic cases when the senior mark was not known either to 
customers or to the junior user at the time of the junior user’s 
adoption.215 
b. Territorial Expansions of Trademark Rights 
A federal registration provides a mark owner with 
constructive use rights nationwide, in the entire territory of the 
United States, thus overriding the basic common law rule that 
geographically limits rights to the area of actual use or actual 
reputation.216  So while the common law corollary to the Tea Rose 
rule countenances an expansion of rights beyond the area of use, 
but only so far as the reputation extends, this statutory 
expansion of trademark rights does not depend at all on either 
use or reputation in the expanded area of priority. 
Despite statutory nationwide priority in a registered mark, it 
is well understood by courts that actual goodwill in the mark 
may not exist nationwide.217  And without a current reputation in 
a territory, many courts are hesitant to find that confusion may 
arise in that territory.218  As a result, those courts have developed 
rules governing the availability of judicial relief for owners of 
registered marks in areas where the owner cannot show current 
goodwill.  The primary rule in this regard is the so-called Dawn 
Donut rule, discussed below, which is highly relevant to 
 
214 See, e.g., Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 
1111, 1121 (6th Cir. 1996); Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 437 F. Supp. 956, 963, 968 
(N.D. Cal. 1977), aff’d, 646 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1980); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, 
§§ 26:16–17. 
215 See, e.g., GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541–42 (10th Cir. 1990); see 
also Woman’s World Shops, Inc. v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1985, 
1988 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (holding, in light of the Hanover Star Milling and United Drug 
cases, that adoption of a senior user’s mark by a remote junior user had not created 
rights in the junior user because the mark had been adopted with knowledge of the 
senior use and thus was not a good faith or innocent adoption, even though the 
junior user argued that it had no intent to trade on the senior user’s goodwill in its 
mark). 
216 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1057(b)–(c) (West 2011); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2006). 
217 See, e.g., GTE Corp., 904 F.2d at 542. 
218 See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364–65 
(2d Cir. 1959). 
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successfully integrating protection for well-known marks with 
the remainder of U.S. trademark law. 
c. Territorial Limits on Trademark Remedies 
Current precedent in most of the federal circuit courts 
disallows the issuance of an injunction in favor of the owner of a 
federal trademark registration in certain circumstances, even if 
that owner clearly has registration-based priority in the 
defendant’s geographic area of use.  These courts will not issue 
an injunction if the owner is not currently using the mark within 
the defendant’s geographic area, has no plans to begin that use in 
the immediately foreseeable future, and has no reputation in that 
area in the mind of the relevant consuming public.219  This is 
known as the Dawn Donut rule,220 after the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc.221  The 
rule stems from an application of the requirement of likelihood of 
confusion, meaning a present likelihood of confusion, which must 
exist for a plaintiff trademark owner to obtain injunctive relief.222  
The Second Circuit refused relief to the federal registrant in 
Dawn Donut, even in the face of a junior use of an identical mark 
for related goods and services, due to a finding that there was no 
current or imminent likelihood of confusion in the relevant 
market—namely, the marketplace where the defendant 
operated.223  This lack of a likelihood of confusion stemmed not 
from the court’s analysis of the mark, the goods, the consumers, 
or the other now-traditional confusion factors,224 but instead 
stemmed from the fact that the registrant had not shown that it 
 
219 See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 26:33–36.  
220 Id. 
221 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959). 
222 Id. at 360. 
223 Id. at 364–65 (including both geographic and market-sector limitations on the 
plaintiff’s current use when considering the relevant market). 
224 See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 496 (2d Cir. 
1961). The factors relevant to confusion include, under the varying formulations 
created by each federal circuit court of appeals: (1) similarity between the junior and 
senior marks; (2) the strength of the senior user’s mark; (3) the relatedness of the 
goods or services offered by the junior and senior users under the marks; (4) the 
likelihood that the senior user will bridge any existing gap between the goods or 
services of the two users; (5) the sales channels in which the marks are used; (6) the 
sophistication of the transaction—or the consumers—in which the parties offer their 
goods or services; (7) any proof of actual confusion; and (8) the intent—or good 
faith—of the junior user in adopting its mark. See id.; see also Champions Golf Club, 
Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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currently operated in the relevant geographic marketplace and 
had no plans to do so in the near future.225  The registrant also 
could not demonstrate that any consumers in the area associated 
it with the mark.226  The court, while denying immediate relief to 
the registrant, did note that if the registrant were to make plans 
to enter the relevant geographic marketplace, it would be able to 
return to court to obtain an injunction at that time.227 
Although closely related to the Tea Rose doctrine, which 
states that a common law trademark owner does not obtain 
trademark rights in any geographical area where the mark is not 
in use,228 the Dawn Donut doctrine is distinct.  As stated by 
Thomas McCarthy, the author of a major trademark treatise, “Of 
course, if the federal registrant can prove that its mark already 
has established a reputation in the junior user’s territory, then 
there is no need for proof of impending entry by an actual sales 
outlet, for a likelihood of confusion exists now.”229  The Sixth 
Circuit has gone even further than McCarthy, in the context of 
national registration rather than common law right, noting that 
the Second Circuit’s almost single-minded focus on likelihood of 
actual market entry in Dawn Donut may be inappropriate in 
certain circumstances.  It has plainly stated that a finding of 
infringement is based on a multi-factor test and cannot be 
defeated by a lack of likelihood of entry alone.230 
 
225 Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 364–65. 
226 See id. 
227 Id. at 365. 
228 See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 26:2. 
229 Id. § 26:34 (citing Crab Cooker v. Specialty Rests. Corp., 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
233 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Consol. Freightways, Inc. v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 524 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Scientific Applications, Inc. v. Energy Conservation 
Corp., 436 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ga. 1977)). 
230 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. CarMax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1056 (6th Cir. 
1999). 
The law of this Circuit holds that no particular finding of likelihood of entry 
or irreparable harm is necessary for injunctive relief in trademark 
infringement or unfair competition cases. . . . The Sixth Circuit has an 
eight point test for infringement liability under the Lanham Act. 
Likelihood of entry is just one of the eight factors under this test, and it is 
not dispositive of liability. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 A concurring opinion went even further, calling for reexamination of the Dawn 
Donut rule nationwide, based on the observation that “our society is far more mobile 
than it was four decades ago [now five decades ago]. For this reason, and given that 
recent technological innovations such as the Internet are increasingly 
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In a sense, the Dawn Donut rule and the Tea Rose doctrine 
are both animated by a trademark’s presence in a market or its 
probable entry into a market, with current presence of a mark 
being defined either by actual sales or by consumer 
understanding or reputation.  If the senior user’s reputation 
exists in the defendant’s trade area at the time of the defendant’s 
adoption of the mark, then the senior user should be awarded an 
injunction against the junior use.231  
d. Application of Domestic Territoriality to Well-Known Foreign 
Marks 
An actual reputation for a trademark in a market creates a 
protectable interest under section 43(a).  At least in the domestic 
context, it seems clear that reputation can exist even without 
local use of a mark.232  If a reputation exists for a senior user and 
a junior use begins, then confusion can exist even without the 
senior user’s local use of a mark. 
Survey evidence offered in both foreign and domestic case 
law demonstrates that reputation and thus consumer 
associations can precede the use of a mark in a particular area.233  
An international border does not necessarily impede this 
reputation-preceding phenomenon.  For example, many 
Americans likely were familiar with “Harrods” and “Marks and 
Spencer” department store services well before either company 
developed any means of accepting orders of goods from the 
United States via their internet sites.  And although the All 
England Lawn Tennis Club has never offered a tennis 
 
deconstructing geographical barriers for marketing purposes, it appears to me that a 
re-examination . . . would be timely.” Id. at 1057 (Jones, J., concurring). 
231 There are a number of cases applying this principle in the context of a federal 
registrant with senior rights to a junior user, when the registrant has a reputation 
in the junior trade area, although it has not yet actually begun to do business in that 
trade area. See Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 614 n.6 (7th 
Cir. 1965); Supershuttle Int’l, Inc. v. Shafer-Schonewill & Assocs., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1762, 1764–65 (D. Colo. 1995); Gastown, Inc. of Del. v. Gastown, Inc., 331 F. 
Supp. 626, 632 (D. Conn. 1971); Travelodge Corp. v. Siragusa, 228 F. Supp. 238, 241 
(N.D. Ala. 1964), aff’d, 352 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1965). A case including an 
international border is Koffler Stores, Ltd. v. Shoppers Drug Mart, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 
697, 704 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff’d, 559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1977). 
232 See supra Part IV.C.1.a. 
233 See, e.g., Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1102 
(9th Cir. 2004); McDonald’s Corp. v. Joburgers Drive-Inn Rest., 1997 (1) SA 1 (SCA), 
at 50–60 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/ 
1996/82.html. 
CP_Lockridge (Do Not Delete) 4/4/2011  2:14 PM 
2010] INT’L OBLIGATIONS IN U.S. TRADEMARK LAW 1403 
tournament here in the United States, there is widespread 
domestic knowledge that “Wimbledon” denotes a tennis 
tournament in England,234 and this knowledge preceded any 
offering of branded goods or services here.235  In addition, 
McDonald’s successfully proved to the South African Supreme 
Court that it had a protectable reputation in South Africa before 
it began to operate there.236  This phenomenon may be infrequent 
in comparison with the large number of trademarks actually in 
use in the world, but it does exist. 
Proof of local use is a proxy for proof of goodwill, which is the 
keystone of commercial and consumer interests protected by 
trademark law.  The notion that trademark rights only extend to 
the area of use is a shortcut to approximate the geographic 
extent of a mark’s goodwill.  The presumption is that a mark has 
attained a level of recognition within any geographic area in 
which it has been used.  Use is, in a sense, a type of 
circumstantial evidence recognized as a valid substitute for direct 
evidence of goodwill.  Proof of use allows a mark owner to prove 
the extent of the goodwill without having to resort to direct 
evidence, such as consumer surveys.  It is the prior existence of 
goodwill, or secondary meaning, within a certain consumer 
population that likely leads to confusion in a mark if a second 
user begins use of the same or a similar mark. 
The reputation and goodwill associated with a mark may 
cross an international border even if the good or service itself is 
not traded across that border.237  Confusion that occurs on one 
side of a border may flow back to the other.  Such confusion in a 
foreign market can harm the mark owner in its home market in 
the form of lessened sales to travelers, damage to reputation that 
 
234 See All-England Lawn Tennis Club, Ltd. v. Creations Aromatiques Inc., 220 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1069, 1072 (T.T.A.B. 1983). 
235 See id. 
236 McDonald’s Corp., 1997 (1) SA 1(SCA) at 62–65.  
237 See, e.g., Vaudable v. Montmartre, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 757, 758, 193 N.Y.S.2d 
332, 334 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1959) (French restaurant with international fame); 
Maison Prunier v. Prunier’s Rest. & Cafe, Inc., 159 Misc. 551, 552, 288 N.Y.S. 529, 
530 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1936) (French restaurant with international fame); see also 
Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 213 F. Supp. 2d 247, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (discussing knowledge in the United States of the COHIBA cigar mark used 
by the plaintiff Cuban company in other countries but not in the United States, 
particularly knowledge that might have been created by a six-page article 
distributed in the United States in Cigar Aficionado entitled “The legend of Cohiba: 
Cigar Lovers Everywhere Dream of Cuba’s Finest Cigar”). 
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hinders expansion, and the like.  Acknowledging that reputation 
can precede use and respecting the confusion that might arise 
from a junior use fit quite well with the basic principles 
underlying trademark law.238 
In considering the existence of goodwill or reputation, and 
thus the possibility of a valid claim for confusion, it is vital to 
recognize that a well-known mark owner would not be barred 
from obtaining relief under the Dawn Donut rule.  In a Dawn 
Donut type case, the registrant has no reputation or goodwill in 
the geographic market at issue.  As such, the court may find that 
no real likelihood of confusion exists.  If a mark is well known in 
the United States, or a portion of its territory, then it has a 
reputation there, meaning that confusion can arise and a 
protectable interest should be recognized.  The Dawn Donut rule 
does not say otherwise. 
In the case of a well-known foreign mark, courts are 
reluctant to recognize, and in fact refuse to recognize in many 
instances, an analogue to the long-accepted domestic situation 
where reputation precedes use.  This resistance is due to the 
existence of an international territorial boundary between the 
area of actual use and the area in which the foreign trademark 
owner enjoys a reputation among consumers without actual use.  
The importance of a territorial boundary in law, and in 
trademark law in particular, however, demonstrates that these 
territorial boundaries should not pose an insurmountable barrier 
to the protection sought by an owner of a well-known foreign 
mark. 
 
2. Extrinsic Territoriality 
In addition to being intrinsic to trademark law, as set forth 
above, concerns about the territorial reach of trademark rights 
are supported outside of trademark law as part of a broader legal 
construct.  The political concern of territoriality, the idea that a 
nation’s laws only have prescriptive jurisdiction within that 
nation’s territory, certainly finds traction in many areas of the 
law.  But providing protection to the foreign owners of well-
 
238 Accord Reichard & Sneed, supra note 175, at 94–95 (finding the Tea Rose 
doctrine to support, rather than deny, protection for well-known foreign marks in a 
territory where the mark has become known without local use). 
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known marks does not contravene the political basis for 
territorial limits on trademark rights. 
The key concern with the political territoriality construct 
recognizes that application of a nation’s laws to govern conduct 
occurring outside the nation’s territorial boundaries will often 
violate the principle of comity among nations.239  Under the Paris 
Convention and TRIPS Agreement conceptions of protecting a 
well-known foreign mark, the conduct being governed by a 
nation’s laws is only conduct occurring within that nation’s 
territory.  There is no comity concern; no nation’s laws are 
extending beyond the scope of its territory.  The ownership rights 
recognized in a trademark may be based upon the well-known 
mark owner’s conduct—namely, extensive use—outside the 
territory, but the conduct being restricted is only the defendant’s 
conduct within the territory.  And the rights recognized within 
the territory are based on the effect of that defendant’s conduct 
within the territory. 
Any injunction issued against a junior user’s U.S. activity 
would restrain only activity in this country.  Moreover, the 
protection of well-known foreign marks by U.S. courts and the 
U.S. trademark office within the United States is an obligation 
the United States willingly undertook close to a century ago.  
Enforcing that obligation does not negatively affect the territorial 
sovereignty of the United States.  By including the obligation to 
protect well-known foreign marks within the relevant treaties, 
the member nations have agreed to recognize, under their own 
territorially limited prescriptive authority, the potential for the 
reputation of certain marks to extend beyond the territory of 
actual use or registration. 
Advocating for the protection of well-known foreign marks 
creates a very slight divergence from intrinsic connotations of 
territoriality in that it requires looking beyond certain shorthand 
rules of thumb that courts use in other, primarily domestic, 
contexts.  But with respect to the political dimension of 
territoriality, there is no divergence whatsoever.  
 
239 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797–98 (1993); id. 
at 813–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also McBee v. Delica Co., 417 F.3d 107, 116–21 
(1st Cir. 2005). 
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D. Standard of Protection and Associated Costs 
Knowledge of a foreign mark in one area of a country should 
not necessarily create nationwide rights, just as the same is true 
of a domestic unregistered mark.  Recognition of the well-known 
status of a mark and subsequent legal protection should be tied 
only to the geographic area where a significant number of the 
relevant consumers are familiar with the mark.  This allows the 
law to appropriately limit the scope of protection for a well-
known foreign mark in a manner analogous to the standard rule 
of thumb governing geographically limited uses.  Moreover, it 
revives the original theory behind trademark law, namely, that 
goodwill is the heart of a trademark.  The extent of injunctive 
relief for an owner of a well-known foreign mark, when likelihood 
of confusion is also proven, would mirror the relief available to a 
domestic common law mark owner in that it would be 
geographically limited.  The injunction provided by a court would 
only reach to the limits of the well-known status of the mark—
the limits of the goods or services in connection with which the 
mark is well known, as well as the geographic limits of 
knowledge by the consuming public.  With a claim based only on 
likelihood of confusion with a well-known mark, the injunctive 
relief granted should be as limited as it would be in a domestic 
dispute related to a simple common law trademark. 
Identifying legal protection for well-known foreign marks in 
current U.S. law and giving some contours to its scope does not 
end the inquiry.  The next question is how well known a mark 
must be to qualify for protection.  Neither the Paris Convention 
nor the TRIPS Agreement defines “well known.”240  Each member 
nation is free to apply an appropriate standard within its 
domestic law.  The Joint Recommendation provides guidance 
beyond the binding agreements, but it also does not prescribe a 
standard of knowledge. 
Courts applying section 43(a) to foreign marks should be 
cautious, but they should not foreclose a claim entirely.  The 
courts should require more than the existence of secondary 
meaning, and they should require more than bare circumstantial 
evidence.  The Ninth Circuit in Grupo Gigante used the standard 
of a “substantial percentage of consumers in the relevant 
 
240 See supra Part II.A–B. 
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American market.”241  The concurring opinion in the Ninth 
Circuit decision declared that a “substantial percentage” would 
be at least fifty percent.242  Given the vagaries of survey 
construction and response tabulation,243 however, a set numerical 
value for the level of familiarity required may not be any more 
helpful than terminology like “substantial” or “significant.”  
Courts should be convinced that the mark at issue is actually 
familiar to an appropriate number of consumers in the market, 
such that real harm to the foreign mark’s owner’s reputation and 
consumer interests might occur if a likelihood of confusion is 
found.  For this reason, careful attention to the type of evidence 
of market familiarity and reputation may be more important 
than specifying a particular percentage of consumers who must 
know of the mark. 
Courts should not accept as sufficient evidence of a foreign 
mark’s goodwill the same type of circumstantial evidence they 
regularly consider in purely domestic cases.  In domestic cases 
involving secondary meaning, courts often readily accept 
evidence regarding sales volume, advertising expenditures, and 
length of time of use as proxies for direct evidence of whether a 
mark has established secondary meaning.244  In cases involving 
foreign marks not yet used in the United States, courts should 
demand more direct evidence of a mark’s reputation among U.S. 
consumers.  Consumer surveys and testimony by individual 
consumers can provide such direct evidence.245  Additional 
evidence in the nature of third-party references, like newspaper 
or magazine articles, or even direct testimony from disinterested 
parties, can be relevant to reputation in appropriate 
circumstances.  If the foreign owner does not have, as it is 
unlikely to have, survey evidence from the time before the junior 
use began, courts can combine evidence of current knowledge 
with other evidence like contemporaneous trade publications or 
 
241 Grupo Gigante SA de CV v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 2004). 
242 Id. at 1108 (Graber, J., concurring). 
243 See, e.g., Vincent N. Palladino, Surveying Secondary Meaning, 84 
TRADEMARK REP. 155 passim (1994); Peter Weiss, The Use of Survey Evidence in 
Trademark Litigation: Science, Art or Confidence Game?, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 71 
passim (1990). 
244 See Boston Beer Co. v. Slesar Bros. Brewing Co., 9 F.3d 175, 182 (1st Cir. 
1993). 
245 See Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 43 (1st Cir. 
2001). 
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popular press articles.  Consumer surveys could also include a 
question asking when, to the best of the consumer’s knowledge, 
he or she first became familiar with the mark at issue.246  Courts 
weigh these varied types of evidence regularly,247 and there is no 
reason to believe they will not be able to use similar judgment to 
assess the approximate level of consumer familiarity that was 
likely present at the time of the initial junior use. 
The junior user’s knowledge of the mark’s foreign use may 
also be relevant.248  Knowledge of the foreign senior use by the 
junior user and how that knowledge was acquired would aid the 
court in assessing whether other members of the relevant public 
in the market at issue were also familiar with the foreign mark 
at the time the junior user began its use.  In other words, it 
would assist the court in determining whether the junior use was 
truly “remote” from the senior use in the way that domestic 
disputes often rely on whether a junior use was “remote” from 
the senior use.249  If the junior user was sufficiently familiar with 
the senior mark to enable it to copy the senior mark, that copying 
may have been done with the intention to confuse, or it may have 
simply indicated an intention to mimic another’s wise business 
acumen in choosing an apt mark.250  Either way, the junior user’s 
 
246 See, e.g., Kerzner Int’l Ltd. v. Monarch Casino & Resort, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 
1029, 1040, 1042 (D. Nev. 2009) (stating that later-developed evidence can be 
relevant to the well-known status of a mark as of an earlier date, but declaring one 
later-performed survey to lack probative value when it did not include an inquiry as 
to when respondents had first heard of the foreign mark in question).  
247 See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 418–20 (6th 
Cir. 2006) (assessing the existence of secondary meaning for trade dress of a 
“Hummer” sport-utility vehicle by reference to very strong evidence in consumer 
studies conducted after infringement); see also Black & Decker, Inc. v. Pro-Tech 
Power Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 834, 851 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that a 1998 survey 
showing eighty-five percent brand recognition was strong enough to establish 
secondary meaning in 1992). 
248 Knowledge of the foreign senior use would not necessarily be significant with 
respect to the typical “defendant’s intent” or “defendant’s bad faith” factor courts 
apply in assessing likelihood of confusion. For analysis of the “good faith” factor in 
likelihood of confusion, see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor 
Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1628 (2006) (arguing that 
based on his empirical study, courts routinely rely heavily on intent when that 
evidence favors the trademark owner). 
249 See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 420 (1916). 
250 U.S. trademark decisions do not turn expressly on intent to confuse or even 
knowledge of the prior right of the senior user. Instead, these matters are considered 
among many others, and completely “innocent” junior users can easily become 
infringers, as long as the constellation of factors points to a likelihood of confusion. 
See supra notes 9, 224. In any event, I do not argue that a junior user’s knowledge 
CP_Lockridge (Do Not Delete) 4/4/2011  2:14 PM 
2010] INT’L OBLIGATIONS IN U.S. TRADEMARK LAW 1409 
familiarity provides some indication of whether other members of 
the relevant consuming market had similar familiarity with the 
mark. 
There are, to be sure, systemic and individual costs 
associated with the recognition of rights in well-known foreign 
marks, even recognition constrained by the standard of 
knowledge set forth above.  U.S. businesses could lose some 
amount of certainty in the process of selecting a trademark.  A 
rule like that set forth by the Second Circuit is certain, and it 
means that all foreign marks not in actual use in this country 
may be adopted here, as long as they are not subject to protection 
through a registration under section 44.  Acknowledging that 
section 43(a) contains protection for well-known foreign marks 
means that U.S. businesses will be charged, to some extent, with 
knowing what their customers know about foreign marks.  
Businesses might also incur somewhat heightened search costs 
related to the search process in that a thorough search for the 
availability of a U.S. mark will need to include the domestic 
popular press as well as more traditional domestic sources of 
information such as trade publications and Dun and Bradstreet 
reports. 
Graeme Dinwoodie has expressed some concern that a strong 
well-known marks doctrine may undermine incentives to 
participate in international registration systems, at a time when 
those systems are becoming more efficient and more  
 
 
 
widespread.251  Widespread failures to participate in 
 
should be determinative in a well-known marks case. Cf. Beth Fulkerson, Theft by 
Territorialism: A Case for Revising TRIPS To Protect Trademarks from National 
Market Foreclosure, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 801, 802, 821–25 (1996) (proposing a rule 
that would allow a foreign trademark owner to block a domestic use or registration 
based on “awareness of foreign use” rather than only in cases of well-known mark 
status). 
251 See Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at 960–61. Despite Professor Dinwoodie’s 
expressed concern related to the potential cost of widely recognizing rights in well-
known marks, he appears to favor correction of the Second Circuit’s total denial of 
rights in those marks under federal law. See id. at 888. He served as counsel of 
record to the American Intellectual Property Law Association when it filed an 
amicus brief with the Supreme Court supporting the foreign trademark owner’s 
petition for writ of certiorari following the Second Circuit decision in ITC. See Brief 
for American Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
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international registration systems would further increase the 
uncertainty in and the costs of selecting a trademark. 
The first two costs or concerns, certainty and search costs, 
while real, will be ameliorated in large part by a known and 
possibly heightened standard for when a mark is “well known.”252  
The last issue, undermining participation in international 
registration systems, should become a non-issue if a sufficiently 
high, yet manageable, standard is set.  Well-known mark 
protection would be, and should be, only a safety net for an owner 
of a foreign mark.  The standard for proving well-known status 
will require, in all likelihood, a consumer survey.  And in any 
event, enforcing rights in a well-known mark through section 
43(a) will require expensive litigation.  As such, any trademark 
owner who is actually examining what steps it should take to 
protect its marks in the United States—or any other major 
market’s jurisdiction, for that matter—is unlikely to rely on well-
known mark protection as its first line of defense against junior 
appropriators.  Although the risk of infringement and associated 
litigation might seem quite low ex ante, the magnitude of the cost 
would still mean that the comparison of costs and the relative 
certainty of protection would direct that trademark owner toward 
filing an application to register the mark on the basis of a foreign 
registration.  In the United States, the most likely route would be 
section 44(e) of the Lanham Act.253 
 
Petitioner at *3–4, ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 552 U.S. 827 (2007) (No. 06-1722), 
2007 WL 2174224 (taking no position on which party should prevail on the merits of 
the case but urging reversal of the Second Circuit decision denying the existence of 
protection for well-known foreign marks under federal law). 
252 Cf. Thomas L. Casagrande, What Must a Foreign Service Mark Holder Do To 
Create and Maintain Trademark Rights in the United States?, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 
1354, 1370 n.93 (2003) (arguing that trademark clearance concerns arising from the 
award of U.S. rights in marks not used within the United States “may be overstated” 
in light of the wide scope of the search in modern clearance practice and “the global 
nature” of the sources used in those searches). 
253 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2006). Section 44(e) states: 
A mark duly registered in the country of origin of the foreign applicant may 
be registered on the principal register if eligible, otherwise on the 
supplemental register in this chapter provided. Such applicant shall 
submit, within such time period as may be prescribed by the Director, a 
true copy, a photocopy, a certification, or a certified copy of the registration 
in the country of origin of the applicant. The application must state the 
applicant’s bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce, but use in 
commerce shall not be required prior to registration. 
Id. 
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A serious foreign trademark owner would have a registration 
in at least one country, likely its country of origin, since the rest 
of the world relies so heavily on registration systems rather than 
the possibility of use-based rights.254  And while a section 44(e) 
applicant must declare a bona fide intention to use the mark in 
commerce in the United States, this is highly unlikely to pose a 
serious practical impediment to an application.  Trademark 
owners who are taking a proactive foreign protection position will 
likely expect to exploit the U.S. market in some way in the 
reasonably foreseeable future, giving them the required bona fide 
intention to use the mark.255  Any applications that might 
otherwise have been made will not be discouraged by the 
requirement of intent to use or the mere availability of possible 
protection as a well-known mark.256  A low standard for what 
makes a mark “well known” might, on the other hand, encourage 
reliance on well-known mark protection and undermine the 
international registration systems.  If only minimal recognition 
by an insignificant number of consumers were required, then the 
likely ease and inexpensiveness of obtaining that proof could 
discourage proactive registration of rights.257 
 
 A court applying the Dawn Donut rule might well deny a remedy to a section 
44(e) registrant who has not followed its registration with domestic use of the mark. 
Thus, the ability to register under section 44(e) may be effective at only blocking 
later registrations but not later uses, due to the intervention of this common law 
rule. Perhaps even more important for foreign owners, section 44(e) only provides 
limited-time protection, since a mark is: (1) deemed abandoned after three years of 
non-use, see id. § 1127 (definition of when a mark will be deemed “abandoned”); 
(2) any registration is subject to cancellation for abandonment, see id. § 1064(3); (3) a 
defendant can assert abandonment as a defense to any section 32 action, see 
id. § 1115(a), (b)(2); and (4) all registrations, section 44(e) included, are subject to the 
requirements of section 8 of the Lanham Act, which mandates periodic filings of 
declarations of use in order to maintain a registration. 
254 See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 2. 
255 In addition, given the lack of such a requirement in the rest of the world, 
many foreign trademark owners will sign the declaration without taking its terms 
very seriously. Without advocating for foreign owners to disregard the requirement 
of a bona fide intention to use the mark in the United States, a realistic observer will 
understand it to be a minor hurdle indeed. 
256 More discouraging to section 44(e) applicants are the standard of 
abandonment, which includes failure to use the mark for at least three years, see 
supra note 253, and decisions in which that standard has been applied to cancel 
registrations held by foreign owners, both in cancellation proceedings at the PTO, 
see, e.g., British-Am. Tobacco Co. v. Phillip Morris Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1585 
(T.T.A.B. 2000), and in litigation, see ITC, 482 F.3d at 145. 
257 See Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at 960–61. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The United States provides protection to the owners of well-
known foreign marks through section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.  
By doing so, the United States meets its international obligations 
to protect those marks under the Paris Convention, the TRIPS 
Agreement, and other international agreements.258  The United 
States has clearly signaled to the international community its 
position that even marks only used in foreign nations must be 
protected if they are domestically well known.259  As a result, it is 
appropriate for the United States to fully come to grips with the 
meaning and value of “territoriality” in its trademark law so that 
it may recognize the existing integration of its obligation to 
protect well-known foreign marks within its domestic, territorial 
trademark law.260 
Asking judicial decisionmakers to confront the full meaning 
of territoriality within trademark law may disturb some 
previously settled expectations and even case precedent set by 
those decisionmakers.261  On a more global and theoretical scale, 
Graeme Dinwoodie urges that any analysis of international legal 
principles, including examination of the recognition of well-
known marks, must be mindful of both the social and the 
political values that inhere in the territoriality of trademarks.262  
Taking these two concerns together merits two separate but 
related questions:  First, whether existing law, as I interpret it, 
constitutes a “significant departure from the principle of 
territoriality,”263 considered by certain experienced judges to be 
“the bedrock principle of [U.S.] trademark law,”264 and second, 
 
258 Debate does remain as to the full extent of the well-known marks obligation, 
namely, whether a nation must protect only marks that are not registered 
domestically, but that are used domestically, or whether a nation must also protect 
marks that have been neither registered nor used here. My argument for the 
broader range of protection is infra Part II.C. 
259 See supra notes 54–62 and accompanying text. 
260 As the Supreme Court observed more than two centuries ago, “an act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other 
possible construction remains.” Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).  
261 Courts in all circuits but the Second Circuit remain free to follow the Ninth 
Circuit’s lead on this issue. In the Second Circuit, of course, either an en banc 
opinion or a Supreme Court decision will be required. 
262 Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at 890. 
263 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 164 (2d Cir. 2007). 
264 Id. at 164 n.26; see also Almacenes Exito v. El Gallo Meat Mkt., Inc., 381 F. 
Supp. 2d 324, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
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whether the approach I urge here “elevate[s] concerns about 
domestic consumer confusion without consideration of other 
values underlying territoriality,”265 thus “ignoring an increase in 
uncertainty and search costs, and . . . undermining the 
established international systems for registration of rights on a 
multinational basis.”266  My interpetation of the statutes, cases, 
and underlying principles, as well as international obligations, 
which requires a high standard of local knowledge before 
protection is provided to a well-known foreign mark and provides 
a limited scope of relief for the owner of the foreign mark, 
remains sound after careful consideration of the intrinsic and 
extrinsic facets of territoriality within trademark law. 
In this Article, I have provided a sound justification and a 
roadmap for recognizing the protection for well-known foreign 
marks that exists in current law.  I have done so in light of a full 
explication of the intrinsic and extrinsic territoriality of 
trademark law, the statutory language of the Lanham Act, and 
existing international obligations.  I appreciate and share the 
concern that well-known foreign mark protection without 
domestic use may “undervalue[ ] the importance of territoriality 
rooted in national political and economic structures”267 in favor of 
overvaluing the aspect of territoriality rooted in consumer 
goodwill.  That concern is better addressed by requiring a strong 
showing of goodwill in the relevant market than by ignoring our 
international obligations and interests.  The approach I advocate 
here accurately characterizes existing protection and provides a 
standard that balances the costs and benefits of protecting well-
known marks within the existing social, cultural, political, and 
economic confines of trademark territoriality. 
 
 
265 Dinwoodie, supra note 25, at 932. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. 
